Eagle versus Dragon

China’s rise is often discussed as inevitable, and for good reason. The country has become an economic powerhouse, with the world’s largest GDP measured in purchasing power. No country has a bigger standing army, and China, with its aggressive foreign policy, massive population, and rich culture, is rightfully regarded as second only to the United States. If China’s nominal GDP surpasses the United States’ in the next few decades, the era of American dominance could finally come to a close. The United States has expressed continuous concern about China’s fast rise as a global superpower. President Donald Trump’s stance, articulated by the administration’s official National Security Strategy, is to label China as a “revisionist” power that must be constrained. Trump has long denounced China’s currency manipulations and lax regulations as hostile to global economic interests, and has since pursued a tariff war against China, perhaps escalating conflict with the rising power.

The once-unipolar world order that emerged after the Cold War is already visibly disappearing. The United States’ unambiguous position as world leader has been weakened by military quagmires in the Middle East, rapid economic advancements in the European Union, and diplomatic breakdowns associated with Trump’s election, which shook international trust in the United States and weakened its standing on the world stage. Yet despite all of this, the United States still maintains global hegemony. The Bretton Woods system created after World War II has endured: American-founded institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, and the World Bank maintain global political and economic order while an ongoing explosion in international trade remains backed by the American dollar as its reserve currency. These institutions, with their emphasis on international trade and multilateralism, represent the American ideal of a world order with itself at the helm.

So how does a rising China fit into an American world? Scholars have described the current dynamic as an example of a ‘transition period.’ If one accepts the notion that China will rise and surpass the United States, that makes this a transitional phase, as the current great power falls and the new, ambitious one rises to become dominant.

David Lai, a research professor at the Strategic Services Institute of the U.S. Army War College, told the HPR more about this transitional model of power. “The transitional phase [can be measured] empirically,” he explained in an interview with the HPR. For Lai, the phase began with the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing, which openly cemented China’s position on the world stage. When asked to make a guess about when this period will end, Lai pointed to 2049, the year President Xi Jinping has promised will be China’s year of “National Rejuvenation.” The many goals along the path to rejuvenation include modernizing China’s military, continuing to prosper economically, developing a foreign policy initiative based on hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, and leading responses to global catastrophes like climate change. It is an ambitious plan, and one that implicitly threatens American military, economic, and diplomatic powers.

Faced with a rising China and a declining United States, American perspectives range from hawkish warmongering to resigned acceptance. Regardless, the United States will have to react somehow, particularly given that, as Lai put it, “it is uncomfortable to see your own power slip away.” Though it is impossible to predict what the American reaction to this shifting power balance will be, transition theory and analysis of the current political atmosphere can help us understand what such a transition of power from the United States to China might look like.

Conflict

While the proposition that the United States and China might soon go to war seems absurd, seeds for conflict already dot the South China Sea. China’s rapid encroachment into the South China Sea against the will of American allies has sparked harsh rhetorical backlash, with open threats of war advanced by the Chinese side. The stakes are high for China, as the South China Sea is a vital source of oil and gasoline for the economic machine that keeps the government stable. Serious military threats to this crucial source of energy from American aircraft carriers could start a limited-scale military conflict.

The position of Taiwan is another perpetual issue for China, representing a military and symbolic threat to China’s territorial sovereignty. One of the core principles of any Chinese superpowerdom will be an emphasis on territorial sovereignty, with this sovereignty including Taiwan. America’s policy of strategic ambiguity, its military presence in the region, and Trump’s apparent support for Taiwan signal the United States’ willingness to back an independent Taiwan. The future of the contested island thus becomes a yardstick for the power struggle more generally: As Lai explained, “whoever wins Taiwan wins the eventual battle.”

Conflict between China and the United States could only be sparked by a level of belligerence not yet exhibited by either side. But an escalation of trade tensions, serious conflict over the future of North Korea, or rising focus on the future of Taiwan could heighten tensions outside of the South China Sea. Still, the United States and China are each other’s biggest trade partners, and each is aware of the other’s immense military strength and large nuclear arsenal. An actual hot conflict would be a catastrophe.

Chen Qi, a professor of international relations at Tsinghua University, told the HPR that both “the United States and China have made a lot of mistakes in the last years.” But the stakes are far too high for either nation to encourage open conflict. For Qi, the idea of an outright war still seems unlikely. “I don’t think there will be a war between these countries … These countries will benefit most from peace and stability,” he predicted during an interview with the HPR.

Containment

With the risks of open conflict obvious, the next logical American response would be a containment policy, which certainly fits the Trump Administration’s official National Security Strategy. This approach focuses on re-energizing alliances with countries like Indonesia and India, strengthening America’s presence and defensive capabilities in the South China Sea, and maintaining free waterways and commerce in the region. The NSS also discusses potential threats associated with Chinese development, such as artificial intelligence and an advancing surveillance state. Additionally, the NSS highlights China’s recent investments in developing nations in Asia and Africa as a potential form of Chinese expansionism. It is clear that the United States will likely work to stall China’s efforts to expand its military, economy, and foreign influence.

This strategy, of countering every Chinese step, is reminiscent of the containment policy pursued by the United States during the Cold War with the Soviet Union. If China does rise as a superpower able to contest the power of the United States, then perhaps it makes sense for the United States to return to its old habits. As China expands its military presence in the South China Sea, the United States might also expand its naval presence in the Asia-Pacific. This will not halt China, but might slow its rise. The NSS does admit, however, that China is too important as a strategic partner to openly oppose.

From a transitional theory perspective, there is a good reason for the United States to work to slow China rather than try to openly stop Chinese growth. Qi noted that as China slowly gains more economic and military power, its diplomatic influence will help solidify its position. Trying to openly attack this foundation from the outside would not be productive. According to Lai, “when a great power rises, nobody can stop it from the outside. Only the Chinese can defeat themselves. Slowing them down increases the chances they screw up.” A policy of containment will slow and frustrate Chinese advancement while also preventing a dangerous open conflict. It is the strategy that worked to defeat the Soviet Union, which collapsed internally rather than from explicitly antagonistic external forces.

However, the comparison between the Soviet-U.S. Cold War and a potential China-U.S. cold war is an imperfect analogy. The United States and China are more connected than the Soviets and Americans were during the Cold War, and have more shared interests. Additionally, China’s economic and investment-based expansion strategy is quite different from the clandestine Soviet expansionism model. A policy of tit-for-tat containment worked well during the Soviet-U.S. Cold War, but China’s ambitions, unlike the Soviet Union’s, are not about conquering the world. So while the military containment strategy is certainly viable, it is unclear exactly what Chinese containment would entail.

Cooperation

After World War II, the mantle of leading superpower passed from the United Kingdom to the United States. It was a transition of power that was neither violent nor unexpected; rather, it followed a negotiation between two allied nations with similar interests. The United States inherited and modified the British system, keeping elements it liked including global capitalism and international trade while removing others that did not fit its vision of modernity. Nara Dillon, a government professor and China expert at Harvard, responded to the analogy in an interview with the HPR: “It does suggest another alternative. What if the United States and China could overcome their differences to the point of being better friends?”

One of the primary aims of contemporary Chinese foreign policy is securing access to global markets. The United States has historically played a major role in shaping China’s access to these markets, and has benefited greatly from China’s economic boom. Maintaining this trade-friendly relationship is key to both nations’ economic vibrancy. Lai characterized China’s approach as “trying to integrate itself into the international system, with no intention to remedy the world.” Qi concurred, explaining that China ultimately “wants to be part of the world order, rather than create the new order.” A China who simply wants to fit into the current Bretton Woods world order is a China that the United States can befriend.

It is decidedly optimistic to imagine the United States and China becoming closer partners, and may be unrealistic to hope that United States would ever be willing to hand over the reins of the global order to China. Major differences between China and the United States compound the unlikeliness of this situation. The United Kingdom and the United States are both majority-white, English-speaking countries with a shared culture and connected histories. The United Kingdom also ended World War II significantly weakened by both the conflict effort and independence movements across the British colonies. In contrast, the American empire has not suffered an equivalent catastrophe, and its political and cultural vision is quite different from China’s.

But if the American century does end, replaced by a system of Chinese leadership, there are foundations for fruitful cooperation. Qi said that “China and the United States do have a lot of shared interests.” He would ask the Trump administration “to give China a chance,” and hopes that as China rises, both China and the United States will “adapt for each other.”

The Chinese Order

A major reason for this ongoing uncertainty is that China has not yet articulated a specific vision for a new world order, making it difficult for the United States to tailor its response. What is known for certain is that China seeks greater integration into world markets, and would rather become a stronger part of the current world system than invent its own. As Lai said, China has no intention to “remedy” the world. Whether or not a China-led world would be a faithful continuation of the American system is still unknown, but the Trump administration may be wrong to label China “revisionist.”

Perhaps the most pressing concern then is the fear that China’s rise will result in a global order with an authoritarian, non-democratic state as its leader. It is unlikely that authoritarian China will lead existing international institutions that call for human rights and liberal democracy. Qi posited that a Chinese order would abandon these concerns, instead focusing international institutions on maintaining territorial integrity. If anything, Qi argued that “China’s model should be more accepted” in the international community.

Lai, however, said he sees a future for democracy under a Chinese order: “I believe China will converge to democracy.” For Lai, authoritarianism is a necessary step on the path to economic development; democracy, he argued, can only be achieved once China has become developed. There is historical precedent for this argument: The authoritarian Asian Tigers of Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea followed similar transition paths, growing from authoritarian developing nations into developed liberal democracies.

While such an outcome may seem like wishful thinking, modern Chinese politics do seem to be heading in that direction. According to Dillon, “the language of democracy is common [in China]. People there value the concept of democracy.” But they are careful in their word choice. Democracy in China is unlikely to ever perfectly mirror the liberal democracies of the West. And while some of this rhetoric, especially in the context of legislation and state politics, may be empty, China does have democratic traditions and urges of its own. Dillon explained that, “For an example, one of the most common reasons people protested against the government in the late 1990s was taxes. All across the country, hundreds of thousands of people were protesting … And the government completely eliminated agricultural taxes in 2006.” Such a rapid response to protests demonstrates the Chinese government’s awareness of and concern for public opinion, something that would not be found in a more extreme authoritarian state.

Transition theory tells us that, for China to become a global hegemon, it must first win its homefront. Facing this challenge, China may democratize and grow closer to the United States — a potential solution that has been underestimated so far. If China wins its internal battles without sacrificing its standing on the global stage, it has the potential to displace the United States from its position of dominance; that being said, a global order with China at its helm may not end up looking so different from the one the United States manages today.

Image Credit: Unsplash / Pen Tsai

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