The City-Suburban Cleavage in Canadian Federal Politics

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Introduction

It has become increasingly common for commentators in the Canadian media and the popular press to talk of city-suburban differences in voting behaviour, political attitudes and values. Typically, the suburbs are seen as fiscally conservative, and thus potential sources of right-wing support, holding different political values and interests from the traditionally more left-leaning urban cores. During the 1997, 2000 and 2004 elections, for instance, it was argued that the Reform, Canadian Alliance, and newly minted Conservative parties respectively had a good chance of winning a number of suburban ridings surrounding large Canadian cities, particularly those in the Toronto region, because, it was claimed, suburbanites might be willing to overlook social conservatism in order to vote for tax cuts (Dale, 2000; Ibbitson, 2000; *Frank Magazine*, 2000; Galloway, 2004; Harding, 2004). As early as the 1993 election campaign, it was noted that the "tax weary middle-class suburban areas" represented "fertile soil" for the Reform party's program (Eagles et al., 1995: 239).

The new Conservative party appears to have embraced this notion. During the televised leaders' debate of the 2004 election campaign Conservative leader Stephen Harper purposefully listed suburbs among the constituencies he felt deserved a "new deal" from government, while at the same time referring to big cities as a "small special interest group" (quoted in Delacourt and Fraser, 2004: A9). A few months earlier, his main rival for the Conservative leadership, Belinda Stronach, dismissed any special help for big cities, and vowed instead to bring the values of

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her hometown, the wealthy suburb of Aurora, Ontario, to federal government (MacCharles, 2004: A7).

Meanwhile, the selection of ex-City of Toronto councillor Jack Layton as leader of the New Democratic party (NDP) in early 2003 was painted as completing the transformation of Canada's social democratic party into an "urban based" party (Lorinc, 2003). To be sure, the urban roots of the NDP go back to J.W. Woodsworth's formative years in Winnipeg and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation's (CCF) Regina Manifesto (see Christian and Campbell, 1990), and it has been long noted that NDP support was shifting to urban areas (Schwartz, 1974: 595).[1] Layton's monograph on urban homelessness (2000) is even evocative of Woodsworth's own writings on urban social problems (1909; 1911). Nonetheless, Layton's victory has been associated with a shift in NDP policy that puts "the plight of Canadian cities on the national agenda" (Sheppard, 2002), driven by an increasingly prominent party "urban wing" (Lorinc, 2003).

Talk of such differences in the intra-urban bases of party support is not confined to federal politics. Indeed, the expectation of potential suburban support for political parties of the right, such as the Progressive Conservatives (PC), the Canadian Alliance and their progeny, the new Conservative party, appears fuelled by the success of the Ontario PCs under Mike Harris in winning suburban ridings in the provincial elections of 1995 and 1999. J. Ibbitson (1997: 19) argues that the 1995 Ontario provincial election was a watershed that saw a right-wing "coalition between the rural descendants of Ontario's settler farmers and middle-class suburbia" take power, while Jeffrey (1999: 205) suggests that suburban support was responsible for the "hard right turn" witnessed during the reign of Harris's PC government in Ontario. The spectre of such a city-suburban cleavage in Ontario continued to haunt the media into the 2003 provincial election campaign, with speculation on its potential demise or persistence (Alphonso, 2003; Barber, 2003; Van Rijn, 2003) and opinion poll results broken down by urban zone (Mallan, 2003).

Despite Canadian media attention as well as a significant academic literature on the subject in the United States, not much would seem to have changed since 1974, when Mildred Schwartz noted in her comprehensive review of Canadian voting behaviour that "no research in Canada has been specifically directed to the phenomenon of suburbanization and its political implications" (Schwartz, 1974a: 596), and 1990, when a prominent Canadian political science text understatedly concluded that "the impact of middle-class suburbia on Canadian voting patterns has not been fully addressed in the literature" (Jackson and Jackson, 1990: 522). Only slightly more academic attention has been given to the subject of city-suburban differences in the provincial context, with almost all of this dealing with the Ontario case. The suburban support base of

Abstract. Despite increasing speculation and attention, as of yet insufficient empirical research has been conducted on the possibility of a political cleavage based on differences between Canadian inner cities and suburbs. This article sheds light on the potential existence of such differences by analyzing federal elections at the level of the constituency from 1945 to 1997. Results show that city-suburban differences in federal party voting did not become significant until the 1980s, and increased after this point, with inner-city residents remaining to the left of the rest of Canada in their party preferences while suburbanites shifted increasingly to the right in their voting patterns. The results obtained from regression analysis suggest that such a divergence cannot be reduced solely to differences in social composition, housing tenure, or region, and thus confirm that it constitutes a 'true' political cleavage. It is argued that intra-urban geography needs to taken into account in future analyses of Canadian political behaviour.

Résumé. Malgré un intérêt croissant pour la question, il existe encore peu de recherches empiriques sur un possible clivage politique dont les fondements seraient les différences entre les quartiers urbains centraux et les banlieues. Cet article jette un nouvel éclairage sur l'existence possible de ces différences à partir d'une analyse des résultats électoraux dans les circonscriptions fédérales entre 1945 et 1997. Les résultats obtenus indiquent que les différences entre le vote pour les partis politiques fédéraux ne sont devenues significatives que pendant les années 1980, mais qu'elles se sont exacerbées par la suite, les résidents de quartiers centraux demeurant à la gauche de l'échiquier politique tandis que les banlieues votaient de plus en plus à droite. Les résultats de l'analyse de régression suggèrent que ces différences ne sont pas seulement attribuables à la composition sociale, au taux de propriété, ou encore à la région, et constituent par le fait même un « véritable » clivage politique. L'auteur conclut que l'analyse géographique intra-urbaine devra être prise en compte dans les analyses futures du comportement politique Canadien.

the Harris PCs' "Revolution at Queen's Park" in 1995 and 1999 is noted by G.E. Hale (1997: 108) and J.A. Boudreau (2000: 65–70), while a more qualitative explanation linking suburbanization and planning to Harris's "common sense revolution" has been attempted by S. Dale (1999), B. Donald (2002) and R. Keil (2002, 2000). Still, it is nonetheless significant that as recently as 1990, mention of a city-suburban cleavage is absent from an academic review of Ontarian voting behaviour (Drummond, 1990); it is also missing from the most recent edition of G. White's (1997) excellent text on Ontario politics and government.[2] Acknowledgement of the role of intra-urban location in structuring political positions has appeared consistently only in writings on Canadian municipal politics and municipal government restructuring (Boudreau, 2000; Brownstone and Plunkett, 1983; Fischler and Wolfe, 2000; Frisken, 1994, 2001; Keil, 2000; Leo, 1977; Sancton, 2000).

This article, building on my recent research (Walks 2004a; 2004b), seeks to address this lack of empirical attention to the potential existence of a political cleavage rooted in Canadian urban and suburban areas. The article begins by delimiting the arguments for expecting political differences between urban zones in Canada and elsewhere, and the history of research on the subject. The article then tests for the existence of city-suburban differences in voting behaviour in Canada's largest urban regions at the federal level by analyzing the aggregate federal election data

from 1945 through 1997. Regression analysis is employed to examine to what degree city-suburban differences can be attributed to spatial differences in social composition, region and/or housing tenure, and whether intra-urban residence plays a role. Finally, the paper estimates the contribution of urban zone effects to city-suburban differences, relative to those of social composition and region, and concludes by discussing the importance of a city-suburban cleavage to the study of politics in Canada.

The Potential Bases of a City-Suburban Political Cleavage

It is curious that so little Canadian research has dealt with city-suburban differences, considering that a provocative hypothesis, presented by S.D. Clark, has been around since 1963. According to Clark, the relative isolation of residents of low-density suburbs from other sections of Canadian society, including inner-city dwellers, makes them feel like outsiders, removed from the political process and distrustful of government and elites. Although Clark saw the suburbs as the creation of an inherently Protestant ethic concerning the separation of work and family life, he also argued that the geographic and social isolation resulting from suburbanization loosened residents' ties to group interests, including those related to religion, ethnicity and class. It was claimed that most such suburbanites were relatively young, had just moved into their first homes, and were seeking "a meaning or purpose in their lives, a sense of social belonging or mission" (1963: 74). This, according to Clark, made them more open to the appeal of new social movements, identifying particularly with Diefenbaker's break from the traditional Conservative image in the late 1950s. Clark's hypothesis would not seem to have ever been tested empirically.

Clark's argument is somewhat different from the explanations put forward at the time by authors in the United States, responding to why suburbanization was followed by a growth in right-wing voting patterns (Dobriner, 1963; Murphy and Rehfuss, 1976). One of these, the "conversion" hypothesis, suggests that the move to a suburban residence works to convert one's political views. Typically, this was linked to a change in housing tenure from tenancy to homeownership, structuring one's political priorities toward balanced budgets, low taxes, and protection of one's property values. This perspective has spurred much research over the years (Rex and Moore, 1967; Saunders, 1978; 1990). In the Canadian context, both G. Pratt (1986; 1987) and N. Verberg (2000) have analyzed the effects of housing tenure on political attitudes and party preferences, finding that tenure seems to have independent effects. Such results have obvious implications for city-suburban differences, considering that tenants are more concentrated in the inner cities and owners in newer suburbs (Mercer

and England, 2000: 62). However, the spatial implications of these findings for Canadian cities and suburbs have yet to be analyzed.

Later on, another theoretical perspective on "conversion," developed by P. Dunleavy (1979) in response to M. Castells' writings on collective consumption (1977: 1978), argued that one's approach to politics was structured by differences in one's primary "mode of consumption," between a publicly subsidized realm of services more common in cities (public transit, public education, public housing and public health), and services procured on the private market and more common in suburban areas (private education, housing, and automobile transportation). Residents of suburban zones should thus be more inclined to support cuts to taxes and the downsizing of public services, as these portend greater consumption potential, while tax and service cuts will be rejected in the inner cities where they threaten the collective consumption on which many residents depend (see also Dunleavy and Husbands, 1985).

A more recent Canadian perspective is put forward by S. Dale (1999). According to Dale, the suburban shift to the right is partly caused by the contradictions inherent in suburban lifestyles, which are in turn related to the way suburbs are planned. Congestion in schools and traffic, as well as the bust in property values during the early 1990s, are said to have made suburbanites feel let down by government and inclined to vote for lower taxes. Ontario suburbs in the 1990s were said to be experiencing similar circumstances to those that spurred California's tax revolt in the 1960s and 1970s (see Gayk, 1991). Dale thus suggests that there may be something ubiquitous about suburban lifestyles that leads residents to adopt right-wing views.

Interestingly, the possibility that lifestyle differences could form the basis of a separate political cleavage in the Canadian context was earlier identified by J. Meisel (1974). Although he did not tie such a lifestyle cleavage to any particular geography, he did suggest that it might deal with such issues as "public transit, protection of the cores of cities, broadcasting policy, assistance to community projects, public support for the arts, and so on" (1974: 17). Based on the weakness of this particular cleavage (it was the weakest of the eight he identified), Meisel predicted that it would not lead to the creation of any new political parties, although he did suggest that it might become more acute over time.

Of course, it is also possible that conversion is due to the more general processes, particularly social interaction, that underlie local contextual effects, also termed "neighbourhood effects" (Cox, 1969). One variant of this, W.L. Miller's (1977) "conversion by conversation" hypothesis, suggests that spatial differences result from an uneven distribution of "core classes". These influence local opinion as the viewpoint of the dominant class wins over greater numbers of adherents than minority views (see also Eagles, 1990; Huckfeldt, 1984; Pattie and Johnston, 2000). While

there is no theoretical reason why these contextual effects by themselves should automatically lead to city-suburban differences, if spatial patterns of segregation among such core classes correspond to city-suburban boundaries and persist, this could then lead over time to a classic city-suburban cleavage, though one highly vulnerable to shifts in intra-urban migration patterns.

The other important hypothesis concerning the creation of city-suburban differences involves the "transplantation" or self-selection of people with right-wing sentiments into the suburbs, based either on life-style preferences or more directly on core political and social values (or a confluence of the two). It is suggested, for instance, that the move to the suburbs is a purposeful strategy for avoiding "the insecurity and disorder of public spaces" (Schneider, 1992: 37). This value preference for a privatized lifestyle also spurs suburban voters to "buy 'private' government" by voting down what W. Schneider calls the "urban strategy," characterized by higher taxes and welfare-state spending (1992: 38). The literature concerning the rise of gated communities in the United States implies that the phenomenon, which to some extent cuts across race and class, is founded upon the desire for security (McKenzie, 1994; Miller, 1981; Oliver, 2001; Blakely and Snyder, 1997).

Of course, self-selection or "transplantation" can just as easily be geared to the inner cities. Writing in the Canadian context, D. Ley (1994; 1996) links the municipal reform movements evident during the 1960s and 1970s to the gentrification of inner-city neighbourhoods by those with left-liberal views. According to Ley, self-selection into the inner cities was caused by a cultural shift in political values that cut across class, race and language, built on the embrace of inner-city lifestyles and a rejection of suburban ways of living. Either way, the result is that such places increasingly concentrate people with like-minded views.[3]

Research on City-Suburban Differences in the United States and Canada

Despite disagreement on whether city-suburban differences derive solely from segregation or one or more of the hypothesized processes discussed above, authors in the United States, such as W.H. Whyte (1956), R.C. Wood (1958) and W.M. Dobriner (1963), agreed early on that the suburbs represented the emergence of a new social and political environment. Empirical research demonstrated that the suburbs were more likely to vote Republican, while the cities, since the time of Roosevelt's New Deal, voted Democrat (Harris, 1954; Phillips, 1969). However, research conducted at the time was inconclusive in explaining the relationship between residential location and voting patterns. Qualitative case studies

showed that a number of suburbs grew solidly Democrat as they became more socially heterogeneous (Berger, 1960; Donaldson, 1969; Gans, 1967; Murphy and Rehfuss, 1976; Wirt, 1965), while quantitative studies that did find divergent patterns of voting concluded that such discrepancies were fully accounted for by differences in social composition, based primarily on race, class, education, age and income (Greer and Greer, 1976; Wirt and Walter, 1971; Wirt et al., 1972; Zikmund,1967). By the early 1970s it was largely assumed that the city-suburban political cleavage was merely the temporary geographical expression of deeper social forces that would soon fade away with growing postwar prosperity, racial equality and social mobility (see Greer and Greer, 1976; Wirt et al., 1972).

However, far from declining, city-suburban polarization in the United States has grown, with implications for the distribution of political representation, and of power, in state, congressional and presidential elections (Archer et al.,1985; Sauerzopf and Swanstrom, 1999; Wolman and Marckini, 1998). Recent research by J. Gainsborough (2001) that analyzes the US national election surveys suggests that place of residence has become increasingly important as an independent predictor of differences in political attitudes in the United States. Starting with Reagan's presidential victory, a voter's residence in a suburb or a central city partly explains their vote choice and some political attitudes, even after controlling for party identification and social characteristics (race, class, gender, religion, education, age and income).

Canadian research would seem to have overlooked the potential existence of a cleavage based in Canadian cities and suburbs, despite a longstanding, ongoing interest in understanding national political divisions based on language (Miesel, 1974; Schwartz, 1974a; Nevitte et al., 2000); religion (Irvine, 1974; Johnston, 1985; Mendelsohn and Nadeau, 1997); class (Gidengil, 1989; 2002; Ogmundson, 1975; Ornstein and Stevenson, 1999); and, particularly, regional geography (Blake, 1972; Gidengil et al., 1999; Schwartz, 1974b; Simeon and Elkins, 1974). The few authors that commented on city-suburban trends in the 1990s (Dale, 1999; Ibbitson, 1997; Keil, 2002) were primarily spurred by a desire to understand the potential suburban basis of Mike Harris's Progressive Conservative victories in Ontario.

Empirical research pointing to the existence of a city-suburban cleavage in the Canadian context is thus very recent. Analyzing the 1965, 1984 and 2000 Canada election surveys to test directly for any independent effect of intra-urban residential location on an individual's party preferences and political values, R.A. Walks (2004a) finds evidence of growing differences in both voting behaviour and political attitudes, with residents of inner cities more likely to adopt attitudes and prefer political parties on the left of the spectrum, while suburban residents (particularly residents of the newer 'outer' suburbs) are increasingly likely to hold atti-

tudes and prefer parties that are to the right of the rest of Canada (and to dislike the NDP). Such research suggests a link between suburbanization and the growth of neoliberal ideology in Canada. Inadvertent survey evidence of city-suburban differences also turns up in M.H Ornstein's (2003) analysis examining party preferences in the 1999 Ontario election study (based on controls for residence in the '416' region, i.e., the amalgamated City of Toronto), and in M. Turcotte's (2001) examination of rural-urban differences in moral traditionalism, although these latter two studies do not attempt to systematically analyze city-suburban polarization.

Walks (2004b) has also recently explored the potential ramifications of city-suburban differences and constant suburban growth for relative levels of political representation and influence between cities and suburbs. While city-suburban polarization was found to be a factor increasingly limiting inner-city representation and influence at the provincial level in Ontario, there was much less of an effect at the federal level, partly due to the greater likelihood of suburbanites (particularly those in the outer suburbs) to back regional parties, while inner-city residents were more likely to vote for nationally based parties, although it remains to be seen how the merging of the two main right-wing parties (into the new Conservative party) will affect these trends.

While the above research has found various political differences between the residents of cities and suburbs, it is yet unclear how the mix of votes in each zone compares to that in the rest of Canada, what particular effect region has on such differences (whether the vote differences apparent in the aggregate data decline when region is controlled for), and whether suburbs still reveal a right-wing bias when analyzed as a whole, rather than separately (as in Walks 2004a; 2004b). Furthermore, it is still unclear what practical effects (in terms of any vote advantage) any differences rooted in place of residence might have in comparison with the effects of social composition, and how individual differences found in the survey research cited above translate into differences between constituencies after social composition is controlled for. The objective of this paper is therefore to shed light on such questions in the context of fifty years of Canadian federal voting behaviour.

Data and Method

This article presents an ecological analysis of city-suburban differences that is based on examination of aggregate voting data at the level of the constituency for all Canadian federal elections from 1945 to 1997. Unlike analysis of individual respondent data, such as that found in the Canada election surveys, an ecological analysis that controls for social composition also implicitly controls for contextual effects that are truly local, as

opposed to regional or zonal (that is, it helps control for "aggregation bias" in G. King's [1997] terminology, or the "neighbourhood effect" in K.R. Cox's 1969 analysis). It is thus a beneficial complement to survey analysis.

The data for this study come from the public record, and are published in the Reports of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada after each federal election and subsequently in the annual Canadian Parliamentary Guides. For this analysis, constituencies are coded depending on whether they fall into one of two intra-urban zones, inner cities or suburbs, within the three largest urban regions in Canada (Montreal, Toronto-Hamilton and Vancouver). Only the largest Canadian urban regions were chosen, as few other metropolitan areas contain a sufficient population and number of ridings over the entire study period to allow for consistent classification of city and suburban electoral districts. The distinction between inner city and suburban constituencies was determined using the 1996 census data for era of development at the census tract level. The inner cities of the Montreal, Toronto, Hamilton and Vancouver areas are defined as the contiguous cores of census tracts built up before the end of the Second World War (1946), with their suburbs defined as the remaining portion of their Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs). The practical effect of this definition is that it includes as inner cities those smaller, older municipalities that grew alongside their central city counterparts—the old cities of Verdun, Westmount and Outremont in the Montreal area, and the old city of York and part of the old borough of East York in the Toronto area. Meanwhile, this definition also means that districts within the cities of Montreal, Vancouver and Hamilton with significant areas built up after the Second World War (such as constituencies in the northern and easternmost parts of Montreal Island, and the constituencies of South Vancouver-Burnaby and Hamilton-Mountain) are included in the suburban zone.[4]

To test for the existence of a city-suburban cleavage, two simple indices were calculated. The index of city-suburban balance in party support compares the share of the vote for each party in inner cities and suburbs for each federal election from 1945 to the present. The index is calculated as the ratio of the proportion voting for the particular political party in the suburbs to the ratio of the proportion voting for the political party in the inner city, multiplied by 100 for ease of comparison (or, index = [party vote % in suburbs / party vote % in inner cities] $*$ 100). A ratio of 100 thus represents parity between the suburban and inner-city vote shares. Ratios above 100 indicate that the party receives greater support from the suburbs and ratios below 100 indicate that the party receives a larger proportion of votes from the inner cities.

A second index, termed here the index of ideological leaning, was created in order to compare the mix of political party support in the urban zones to that in the rest of Canada. The index of ideological leaning is

calculated as the ratio of vote shares between right- and left-wing political parties in each zone, compared to the ratio of vote shares between right- and left-wing political parties in the rest of Canada (index = [urban zone RW%/LW%] / [rest of Canada RW%/LW%] ∗ 100). A ratio of 100 in this case indicates parity between the ideological leaning (mix of party support) in a particular urban zone and that in the rest of Canada. Results above 100 indicate that the urban zone leans to the right of the rest of Canada (towards the PCs, Social Credit and the Reform party, and away from the CCF / NDP), while results below 100 indicate that the urban zone leans more to the left (towards the CCF and the NDP and away from the PCs, Social Credit and the Reform party) than does the rest of Canada. This method factors out the vote for the Liberals and Bloc Québécois,[5] thus controlling for general fluctuations in support for parties of the 'centre' that would make it more difficult to discern patterns over time at the extremes of left and right.

To test for the independent contribution of zone of residence, region and social composition in producing differences in voting patterns between inner cities and suburbs over the study period, OLS (ordinary least squares) regression models are estimated. Three key elections are chosen for this analysis: the 1965, 1980 and 1997 federal elections. The 1965 election represents a period in which support for parties of the left was high, particularly within urban Canada, and is one of the first elections for which reliable social composition data is available. The 1980 election is one of the first to see political polarization between inner cities and suburbs. The 1997 election, meanwhile, represents the election with one of the largest degrees of political polarization between inner cities and suburbs (particularly for parties furthest to the left and right), and was the most recent election (at the time of writing) for which relevant social composition data was available at the level of the constituency, derived from the 1996 census.

Two sets of regression models are estimated. The first set of regression models controls only for region. It estimates the raw vote advantage of residence in inner cities and suburbs, compared to the rest of Canada, accruing to each political party. The dependent variable is the proportion of the total vote going to each particular political party, while the independent variables are those for intra-urban zone and region. The intra-urban zone variables are coded as simple indicator variables (with the rest of Canada as the base). The region variables are coded as deviation indicator variables, with Ontario as the base (−1), in order to estimate the advantage for each political party of residence in each region relative to the Canadian average. The resulting coefficients indicate the aggregate effect of residence at both levels of geography (intra-urban zone and region) for increasing or decreasing support for each political party, in percentage terms.

The second set of regressions control for both social composition and region. The urban zone and region variables remain exactly as in the first set of regressions, but data are added about the social composition of each constituency relating to gender balance, age structure, ethnicity and immigration status, language, occupational structure and income levels. Compositional variables for housing tenure are also added in order to examine whether any city-suburban differences can be explained as the result of the significant tenure differences. Information on social composition for the 1980 and 1997 elections was calculated from the 1981 and 1996 census of Canada, respectively. The more limited social composition data for the 1965 election was compiled and aggregated by Donald Blake from the 1961 census and made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), as no other census data aggregated to the level of the constituency are available for that year.

The list of social composition variables examined for each election and their distribution across the zonal categories is provided in Table 1. Note that widening discrepancies between inner cities and suburbs characterize only nine of the 23 variables analyzed for both the 1980 and 1997 elections (from the 1981 and 1996 census), and for one of these (the proportion married) the disparity narrowed from 1961. Note also that increasing zonal disparity in visible minority status and the proportion speaking French at home are mostly due to increasing differences in the Montreal region, and do not reflect realities in the other study regions. The remaining 14 variables reveal either little change in the years between 1980 and 1996, or a decline in discrepancies (this includes both household income and housing tenure).

To deal with the large number of variables, a backwards OLS regression was employed that removed from the model those variables having little independent effect on vote choice. Coefficients for the social composition variables show the percentage increment associated with a one per cent increase in their proportion, while coefficients for the intra-urban zone and region variables reflect the total vote advantage at each level of geography (in percentage terms), as in the first set of regressions. Comparison of the two sets of regression models thus allows one to ascertain whether urban zone of residence still has any effect on voting patterns after controlling for social composition. The OLS regression technique utilized here was chosen over other methods, such as King's (1997) ecological inference method, for three reasons: it provides constant coefficients for place of residence that hold across zonal classes; it allows for the inclusion of multivariate data; and it is able to 'overestimate' the effect of a particular social group and thus to incorporate into the models the additional effects of local context (due to the fact that OLS regression allows the possibility that each one per cent

TABLE 1

Distribution of Compositional Variables Used in the Analysis, by Zone of Residence, 1961, 1981, 1996

	1961 Census/1965 Election			1981 Census/1980 Election			1996 Census/1997 Election		
	Inner cities	Suburbs	% Diff.	Inner cities	Suburbs	% Diff.	Inner cities	Suburbs	% Diff.
% Gender—male	48.5	49.7	1.2	48.2	49.2	1.0	48.4	48.7	0.3
% Ages 15–24 (20–24 in 1961)	7.6	5.8	−1.8	18.0	18.7	0.7	12.1	13.4	1.3
% Ages 25–34	15.7	14.8	−0.9	18.9	17.5	−1.4	21.6	15.2	***−6.4***
% Ages 35–49	20.2	19.9	−0.3	17.1	19.4	2.3	22.9	25.3	2.4
% Ages 50–64	15.5	11.6	−3.9	16.6	14.3	−2.3	13.6	14.3	0.7
% Ages 65 +	9.4	6.5	−2.9	13.9	8.2	−5.7	14.2	11.6	−2.6
% Married, ages 15+ (ages 20+ for 1961)	61.8	79.2	17.4	41.3	49.0	7.7	38.8	52	***13.2***
% Speaking French language at home	31.6	28.2	−3.4	18.5	24.5	6.0	21.1	28.4	***7.3***
% Speaking language not English or French at home	na	na	na	21.5	9.7	−11.8	33.9	24.5	−9.4
% Recent immigrants (arriving in the roughly 15 years prior)*	(16.3)	(9.2)	(−7.1)	13.8	7.9	−5.9	27.1	20.0	***−7.1***
% Visible minorities~ (see note)	1.9	0.7	−1.2	10.2	6.0	−4.2	26.0	19.5	***−6.5***
% Aboriginal	1.7	1.9	0.2	0.6	0.5	−0.1	0.9	0.6	−0.3
% Jewish	6	2	−4.0	5.2	1.8	−3.4	5.3	1.8	−3.5
% Educated with less than grade 9	47.7	41.9	−5.8	24.7	16.9	−7.8	31.9	32.3	0.4
% Educated with university degree	7.5	7.9	0.4	13.1	9.1	−4.0	22.7	13.9	***−8.8***
% Employed in agriculture	0.4m	4.3m	3.9m	0.3	1.8	1.5	0.4	1.5	1.1
% Employed in manufacturing/ mining	29.5m	29.8m	0.3m	20.4	23.1	2.7	14.2	17.4	***3.2***
% Employed in professional* & managerial occupations	18.2m	21.5m	3.3m	15.0	15.8	0.8	31.3	26.3	***−5.0***
% Government employees*	na	na	na	4.5	5.4	0.9	4.1	4.4	0.3
% Self-employed*	na	na	na	4.8	4.6	−0.2	11.8	11.3	−0.5
% Unemployed*	na	na	na	10.1	8.3	−1.8	10.9	8.2	***−2.7***
Average household income (employment income in 1961)($)	3,906	4,531	16.0	22,354	27,322	22.2	45,450	53,819	18.4
% with incomes between $0 and $2,999^	35	25.3	−9.7	na	na	na	na	na	na
% with incomes between $3,000 and $5,999^	54.6	55.4	0.8	na	na	na	na	na	na
% with incomes between $6,000 and $10,000^	7.8	15.6	7.8	na	na	na	na	na	na
% with incomes over $10,000^	2.7	3.8	1.1	na	na	na	na	na	na
% Dwellings rented*	na	na	na	67.5	38.2	−29.3	63.7	36.5	−27.2

Source: Calculated by the author from census of Canada, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1996. The 1961 census data were collected by Donald Blake and made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).

Notes: (*) Variable not available in 1961. (^) Variable only available for analysis of 1965 voting pattern. (~) For analysis of the 1965 election, the percentage of the population with ethnicity "Asiatic" and "other" (that is, not European or Native) was used as a proxy for visible minorities, as the percent visible minorities was not available. (m) Males only. Bracketed figures are for immigrants arriving between 1946 and 1964, estimated from the 1971 census and not included in the regression analysis. Bolded results for 1996/1997 show those variables demonstrating widening city-suburban disparities since 1980/1981.

increase in a particular social group could produce more than a one per cent increase in the share of the vote going to a particular party). This method thus implicitly controls for the neighbourhood effect of "core classes," as put forth in W.L. Miller's (1997) hypothesis. Such local neighbourhood context effects can thus be separated from those for zonal residence, providing potentially more conservative estimates of the latter.[6]

Because in this article the inner and outer suburbs are analyzed together (departing from the methodology employed in other studies by the same author, see Walks, 2004a; 2004b) it is possible to calculate the relative contribution of social composition and zone of residence for the articulation of intra-urban zonal differences in party voting, which are mathematically far more difficult in a multi-zonal model. In this article, the OLS regression coefficients for urban zone, which show the relative vote advantage of inner-city and suburban residence for each party, are used to adjust the zonal vote shares for the 1997 federal election to reflect what city-suburban differences in party voting would have been if, according to the regression models, there had been no independent effect of zone of residence. This is done by reducing (or augmenting, in the case of negative coefficients) the actual aggregate vote totals in each zone by the value of the OLS coefficients for zone of residence. This essentially factors out the "place effects" from the aggregate vote distribution. Using these adjusted vote shares, new indices of city-suburban balance in party support and of ideological leaning are calculated, with the difference between the original and the adjusted index values used to estimate the independent contribution of the intra-urban place of residence variables to overall city-suburban differences in federal voting.

Another way of measuring the relative importance of place of residence for the production of city-suburban vote differences is to compare the minimum proportion of geographical variation in the vote across the largest metropolitan areas that is independently explained by urban zone effects to the proportion that is explained by the effects of region and social composition. Estimates of the relative importance of each of these sets of variables for understanding geographic variation in levels of support for each political party are acquired by comparing the *r squared* values attained when the full regression models are estimated to the *r squared* values attained when each set of variables (urban zone, region, social composition) is separately left out of the models (the dependent and independent variables remain unchanged). This second method thus allows comparison of the *r squared* values attributed to each set of variables over time, and thus of the relative contribution of intra-urban residence after controlling for both region and social composition.

Results

Divergence of Inner City and Suburban Voting Patterns

Examination of aggregate voting results shows an increasing disparity in the way inner cities and suburbs have voted in Canadian federal elections. Figure 1 plots a suburbs/inner-city vote index for each federal election from 1945 to 1997, based on a comparison of the aggregate vote share for each party attained in suburban ridings to the vote share attained in inner-city ridings for Canada's three largest urban regions. Until the late 1970s, there is little evidence of any city-suburban cleavage. There is minimal difference in the way that inner cities and suburbs voted for

FIGURE 1
City-Suburban Balance of Federal Party Support, 1945–1997



Source: Calculated by the author from Reports of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, various years, and Canadian Parliamentary Guide, various years.
Notes: The index is calculated as the ratio of the proportion voting for the political party in the suburbs to the ratio of the proportion voting for the political party in the inner city (or, index = (party vote % suburbs / party vote % inner cities) ∗ 100). A ratio of 100 represents parity between the suburban and inner-city vote shares for the party in question. Ratios above 100 indicate that the party receives a higher proportion of votes from the suburbs, while ratios below 100 indicate that the party receives a higher proportion of votes from the inner cities. Election results for 1957 were left out due to discrepancies in available data from the Canadian Parliamentary Guide.

each of the main political parties, although the Liberal party tended to get slightly more support from the inner city, while parties of both the right and left tended to enjoy slightly more support from the suburbs. However, beginning in the early 1980s, the results indicate an increasing divergence between inner-city and suburban voting. The suburbs increasingly voted for the political parties on the right of the spectrum (the Progressive Conservatives and the Reform party, the latter only important since the 1993 election), while support for the New Democratic Party shifted away from the suburbs to the inner cities. By 1997, the inner cities are about three times more likely to vote NDP than are the suburbs, while the suburbs are twice as likely to vote for the Reform party as the inner cities. Support for the Liberal party remains remarkably even, with a ratio just under 100 for most elections (indicating that it enjoys marginally greater support in the inner city) although it temporarily departs from parity during the mid- and late 1980s, when Brian Mulroney led the Progressive Conservatives to two election victories. The Bloc Québécois, meanwhile, received more support from Montreal's suburbs than from its inner core, although it should be noted that this is somewhat dependent on very strong support in only a few ridings. Regression results (below) furthermore suggest that city-suburban variation in support for the Bloc is mostly due to language differences (this is also substantiated by research conducted on individual survey responses in the Canada election studies, see Walks, 2004a).

These results are not dependent on the method of aggregation. Very similar patterns appear when each urban region is analyzed separately (not shown due to space limitations, please contact the author for details). The starkest change in voting patterns over time is found in the Vancouver region (with all three parties swapping their zonal bases of support dramatically), while the strongest tendency to increasing polarization is found in the Toronto-Hamilton urban region. City-suburban polarization is also clearly evident in the zonal balance of voting for the Liberals and PCs in Montreal both before and after the formation of the Bloc, although it is milder in the Montreal region than in the other study areas.

Although Figure 1 suggests that inner cities and suburbs are diverging from each other in their voting patterns, it may still be that one of these areas is merely diverting from the course set by Canada as a whole. Are the suburbs moving to the right of the rest of Canada, or are the inner cities moving to the left, or are both processes occurring simultaneously? The answer is provided in Figure 2, which shows shifts in the ideological leaning (the ratio of support between right- and left-wing parties) of each urban zone in comparison to that found in the rest of Canada. This index controls for Canada-wide swings in voting based on the changing popularity of parties of the centre, and is thus more sensitive to relative shifts in support for parties at the extremes.

FIGURE 2
Index of Ideological Leaning of Each Urban Zone in Comparison with the Rest of Canada, 1945–1997



Source: Calculated by the author from reports of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, various years, and the Canadian Parliamentary Guide, various years.
Notes: Index of ideological leaning is calculated as the ratio of the vote shares between right- and left-wing political parties in each zone, compared to the ratio of vote shares between right- and left-wing political parties in the rest of Canada (index = (urban zone RW%/LW%) / (rest of Canada RW%/LW%) ∗ 100). A ratio of 100 indicates parity between the ideological leaning (mix of right-wing and left-wing votes) between a particular urban zone and the rest of Canada. Results above 100 indicate that the urban zone leans toward political parties of the right (PC, SC, Reform/Canadian Alliance) more than does the rest of Canada, while results below 100 indicate that the urban zone leans more towards parties of the left (NDP) than does the rest of Canada.

Figure 2 shows a fascinating pattern of movement over time in terms of federal voting behaviour. From 1945 until the mid 1970s, there is remarkable similarity between the mix of votes in inner cities and suburbs. Between 1945 and the mid-1960s, residents of the inner cities and suburbs together shift to the left in their mix of votes (that is, towards the CCF/NDP and away from the PCs/Social Credit, to a greater degree than found elsewhere in Canada). Then, from the mid-1960s until about 1979, inner city and suburban residents shift back toward the mix of party preferences found in the rest of Canada. However, after 1980 the sub-

urbs shift increasingly to the right of the rest of Canada in their ideological leaning. (The pattern is similar, although less dramatic, when the Bloc Québécois is included as a 'left-wing' party [not shown], see endnote 5). The inner cities, on the other hand, remain about as 'left' as they were in the late 1960s. The result is a clear pattern of increasing political polarization beginning in 1980, with the inner cities remaining to the left while the suburbs move ever further to the right of the rest of Canada. This would appear to signal the existence of a significant and intensifying political cleavage.

The Effect of Zone of Residence, Region and Social Composition on the Vote

The analysis thus far has examined shifts in the aggregate vote across urban zones, and found evidence of a potential city-suburban cleavage back to the early 1980s. To what extent is this cleavage rooted independently in urban place of residence? To what extent might such shifts be due to differences in social composition and/or housing tenure between inner cities and suburbs? Regression analysis suggests little evidence of any cleavage based in intra-urban residence in 1965. While regression results for 1965 show that intra-urban residence had an important and relatively strong independent effect on vote choice at the time, though not nearly as strong as region, the effect of residence in the inner cities or suburbs is virtually identical, even after controlling for social composition (Table 2). The effects are stronger for inner-city residence than for living in the suburbs, but the direction is the same.

Controlling only for region, inner-city residence added over ten per cent to the vote for the NDP, and over six per cent to the Liberal vote, while decreasing the PC vote by almost five per cent. The effect of suburban residence was similar, although weaker by about two percentage points. The independent effect of intra-urban residence on NDP support is weakened somewhat by the inclusion of the social composition variables in the model, while the effect of place of residence on Liberal support is strengthened slightly when social composition is controlled for (as is the lack of support for the Créditistes in Montreal's inner core). After the regional variables, the age structure would seem to have the strongest effect in structuring the vote, followed by education, although it should be noted that the limited number of variables available in the 1961 data prevents a full comparison. Zone of residence falls out of the models for Progressive Conservative and Social Credit support after social composition variables are added, suggesting that social composition explains entirely the lack of support for those parties in large Canadian cities and suburbs. In short, while place effects were indeed uncovered, these were found to lie between the metropolitan regions and the rest of

TABLE 2
Effect of Zonal Residence on Party Vote, 1965 (Regressions)

	Controlling for region only (A)					Controlling for region and social composition (B)				
	NDP	Liberal	PC	SC	Cred.	NDP	Liberal	PC	SC	Cred.
Constant	***14.9	***34.5	***36.8	***9.4	***5.7	—	—	—	—	—
N =	261	261	260	185	75	261	261	261	185	75
R squared	0.45	0.53	0.43	0.57	0.004	0.85	0.96	0.94	0.76	0.81
Urban Zone										
Inner cities	***10.2	***6.2	*−5.0	−2.7	−2.2	**6.2	***6.9	—	—	*−12.2
Suburbs	***7.6	**4.6	*−4.5	−0.6	−0.1	**5.1	**4.9	—	—	—
Region										
Atlantic	***−9.0	***15.4	**6.4	−9.1	Na	***−6.2	***11.8	**7.02	***−12.1	Na
Quebec	***−8.8	***8.2	***−11.9	Na	Na	***−12.8	—	—	Na	Na
Prairies	***8.5	***−7.9	***9.2	***−5.9	Na	***11.0	−2.7	—	***−4.5	Na
Alberta	***−7.0	***−15.3	***11.5	***14.6	Na	***−7.1	***−11.6	***9.8	***14.5	Na
B.C.	***14.0	***−7.9	***−15.3	***8.9	Na	***16.1	***−8.0	***−16.4	***11.0	Na
Composition (%)										
Ages 18–24						—	—	—	—	***8.98
Ages 25–34						—	—	—	—	**−3.74
Ages 50–64						*1.50	—	—	*0.96	—
Ages 65 +						***−1.65	—	***1.96	—	**−3.20
French at home						—	***0.096	***−0.12	*−0.05	—
Other L at home						—	—		—	—
Edu < grade 9						*−0.62	**0.79	—	—	***1.23
Edu U degree						*−0.85	**0.96	—	—	**3.06
Visible minorities						—	—	**−1.81	—	—
Aboriginal						—	−0.35	0.39	*−0.24	—
Jewish						***0.61	—	**−0.54	—	—
Agric. wkrs						—	***−0.21	***0.24	—	*0.43
$0 to $2.9K						—	***0.36	—	***0.20	***−0.97
$3 to $5.9K						—	***0.15	*0.10	***0.13	—
$6K to $10K						—	*0.47	***0.49	—	*−1.59

Source: Calculated by the author from election results (from the Report of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada for the 1965 election. The 1961 census data were collected by Donald Blake and made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).

Notes: (A) Coefficients show the raw vote advantage of residential location in relation to the rest of Canada (rest of Quebec for the Ralliement des Créditistes) after performing OLS regression. The constant can be read as the average proportion of the vote going to the party in question in constituencies outside of urban areas (in the 'rest of Canada') (rest of Quebec for the Ralliement des Créditistes).

(B) Coefficients show the raw vote advantage of residential location in relation to the rest of Canada (rest of Quebec for the Ralliement des Créditistes) after performing backwards OLS regression and controlling for region and social composition. Only the variables that remain in the model after the backwards processing are shown. The models were run through the origin, with no constant requested. The *r square* measures for these results therefore indicate the proportion of the variability in the dependent variable about the origin explained by regression, and cannot be compared to r square measures for models which include an intercept.

NDP = New Democratic party, PC = Progressive Conservative party, SC = Social Credit party, Cred. = Ralliement des Créditistes

Sig. = *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001

the country, not between inner-city and suburban residents, in 1965. Suburban and urban residents voted almost identically.

The importance of place of residence for understanding the vote would seem to have declined between 1965 and 1980 (Table 3). The vote advantage accruing to the NDP in both the inner cities and suburbs dissipated, as did the advantage for the Liberals in the suburbs (partly due to the rise in Liberal support elsewhere in the country). The coefficients for the regional variables are still far stronger than those for the urban zones, and there is clear evidence of an increased regional polarization of the vote for all three major parties (while intra-urban differences declined). Within the urban zones, the only evidence of any polarization is the six per cent advantage accruing to the Liberals and the almost equal disadvantage for the PCs in the inner city.

Furthermore, when social composition is controlled for, the effect of intra-urban place of residence disappears altogether. It would appear that place of residence was not a factor in the articulation of preferences for any party in 1980. Segregation based on age, language, immigration status and occupation was most important in explaining differences in voting, while rental housing tenure had an effect in bolstering Liberal support and in tempering the PC vote (however, the latter result is not statistically significant). The differences in gender, age, language, immigration status and ethnicity, tenure and occupation on their own account for most of the discrepancy in voting behaviour between inner cities and suburbs in 1980.

The political landscape changed considerably between 1980 and 1997. The Reform party and the Bloc Québécois not only attained significant support, but had used the 1993 and 1997 elections to swap official party status, and by 1997 had gained more votes than two of Canada's traditionally strong parties (the NDP and the Progressive Conservatives). It is interesting to note that the party structure in the 1990s is somewhat similar to that in 1965, with Reform and the Bloc receiving much of their support from the same places that voted Social Credit and Créditiste. One main difference, however, is that in 1997 these regional parties were able to garner a much greater proportion of the total vote than in 1965.

Controlling only for region, the regression results provide further evidence of an emerging city-suburban cleavage in 1997. This is particularly true for the NDP's share of the vote, to which residence in the inner city adds a 5.6 per cent advantage, but in the suburbs more than a 3 per cent disadvantage. The inner cities clearly show a mix of party preferences that is to the left, providing greater support for the NDP and the Liberals, and less support for the Progressive Conservatives, Reform and the Bloc. The pattern is less evident for the suburbs, however. The vote disadvantage for both the NDP and the Reform party in the suburbs matches almost exactly the advantage going to the Liberals (6 per cent),

TABLE 3
Effect of Zonal Residence on Party Vote, 1980 (OLS Regressions)

	Controlling for region only (A)			Controlling for region and social composition (B)		
	NDP	Liberal	PC	NDP	Liberal	PC
Constant	***21.8	37.5	37.6	—	—	—
N =	281	281	282	281	281	282
R squared	0.58	0.78	0.63	0.93	0.98	0.96
Urban zone						
Inner cities	1.1	**6.1	*−5.6	—	—	—
Suburbs	−0.8	0.6	2.9	—	—	—
Region						
Atlantic	***−5.0	***9.8	−2.3	—	***12.4	*−3.5
Quebec	***−12.7	***29.2	***−24.6	***−6.2	***14.6	***−10.8
Prairies	***13.6	***−11.8	0.8	***11.4	**−4.9	*−4.8
Alberta	***−10.9	***−15.1	***26.7	***−16.6	***−14.3	***24.4
BC	***14.1	***−15.9	2.8	***10.6	***−12.4	—
Composition (%)						
Gender—male				**1.15	***1.3	—
Ages 25–34					***−1.47	—
Ages 50–64				*0.43	**−0.90	*−0.81
Ages 65 +				—	—	***1.26
Married				*−0.33	—	***0.60
French at home				—	***0.23	***−0.20
Other Language at home				**0.31	**0.38	***−0.44
Edu < grade 9				***−0.57	—	—
Edu U degree				—	*0.69	—
Recent immigrant				**−0.60	*−1.00	**0.50
Visible minorities				—	0.60	*−0.35
Aboriginal				***0.40	***−0.45	—
Jewish				—	*0.33	***−0.52
Agric. wkrs				***−0.41	**−0.29	***0.60
Manufact. wkrs				—	—	*0.20
Prof./Mgr. wkrs				***−1.00	**−0.97	***1.53
Gov. wkrs				−0.18	—	0.26
Ave HH inc (/ $1000)				—	0.04	—
Dwellings rented				—	***0.31	−0.08

Source: Calculated by the author from election results (from the Report of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada for the 1980 election). Social composition data from the 1981 census of Canada.
Notes: (A) Coefficients show the raw vote advantage of residential location in relation to the rest of Canada after performing OLS regression. The constant can be read as the average proportion of the vote going to the party in question in constituencies outside of urban areas in the 'rest of Canada.'
(B) Coefficients show the raw vote advantage of residential location in relation to the rest of Canada after performing backwards OLS regression and controlling for region and social composition. Only the variables that remain in the model after the backwards processing are shown. The models were run through the origin, with no constant requested. The r square measures for these results therefore indicate the proportion of the variability in the dependent variable about the origin explained by the regression, and cannot be compared to *r square* measures for models which include an intercept.
NDP = New Democratic party, PC = Progressive Conservative party. Sig. = *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001

while Progressive Conservative and Bloc support appear untouched by suburban residence. Thus, while region remained far more important than intra-urban zone for creating geographic unevenness in the vote in 1997, it is also clear that party preferences had come to differ across urban zones much more than in earlier periods.

The suggestion that such an emerging city-suburban cleavage is rooted in place of residence is bolstered by the coefficients remaining from the backwards regression after controls for social composition are added to the models for 1997. After controlling for region and composition variables (including housing tenure), place of residence in the inner cities is associated with a four per cent advantage for the NDP, and a six per cent disadvantage for the Progressive Conservatives. Furthermore, the effect of suburban residence reverses from a three per cent disadvantage to a 2.3 per cent advantage for the Reform party. Social composition and region together account for constituency differences in Liberal and Bloc support, with place of residence showing no statistically significant effect in the latter cases. As in 1980, age, language, gender, ethnicity and occupation influenced levels of support for each of the political parties to a significant degree, with the self-employed category having a particularly strong effect across all parties in 1997. While the effect of certain variables remained similar (such as the association between a large proportion of managers and professionals with PC votes), other shifted significantly (particularly, the effect of being of working age). Tenure of housing has a weak positive effect for both the Liberals and the Reform party, but has little effect on support for the other parties. Although the effect of urban zone is relatively small in relation to the effect of social composition (taken as a whole) and to regional effects, these ecological regressions support the existence of a separate if moderate political cleavage based on urban form and lifestyle differences that would appear somewhat independent of the effects of housing tenure and social background.

It should be noted that the methodology employed here (allowing for regression coefficients of compositional effects to over-estimate the impact of the presence for a particular group) implicitly controls for social context effects associated with composition, and thus provides an even tougher bar for establishing a zone of residence effect. Thus, it might be expected that the results for zone of residence are relatively weak after controlling for such effects. These results at the same time provide positive, though weak, support for Miller's (1977) hypothesis concerning the effect of dominant "core classes" on local opinion (in this case, the positive effect of concentrations of managers and professionals on the PC vote), although it should also be pointed out that the mechanisms by which it is assumed to occur (such as conversation and social contact) cannot be proven here.

The Relative Contribution of Urban Zone, Region and Social Composition to City-Suburban Polarization

These regression coefficients can subsequently be used to modify the initial indices of city-suburban zonal and ideological leaning derived from the aggregate voting data for 1997, in order to provide a rough estimate of the proportion of the city-suburban differences in party preferences that result from urban-zone/place effects versus those resulting from region or social composition.[7] When the effects of zone of residence on the vote for each of the relevant political parties, as uncovered in the regression models for 1997 (from Table 4), are factored out of the 1997 indices of city-suburban vote balance and ideological leaning (shown in Figures 1 and 2), discrepancies in voting between inner cities and suburbs decline significantly, by between 37.3 per cent and 40.1 per cent (Table 5). As might be expected, this exercise has the most significant effects on the zonal balance of support for the PC, NDP and Reform parties, with little effect on the index values for the Liberals or the Bloc. It can therefore be assumed that the remaining voting differences (between 59.9 and 62.7 per cent of the original differences, depending on the index) are due to differences in social composition (including housing tenure) and region. Thus, although the impact of place of residence on party voting is moderate and only important for three of the five political parties in 1997, this nonetheless would seem to have a significant effect in producing the city-suburban differences evident in Figures 1 and 2.

However, despite the important contribution that independent urban zone effects make to the two indices of city-suburban polarization, comparison of the proportion of constituency variation in levels of support across the different political parties that can be explained by zone of residence versus social composition and region (the *r squared* values) suggests that urban zone only has a marginal impact on vote choice on its own (see bottom of Table 5). The strongest results concern the NDP and the PC vote, but even in these cases, urban zone only explains 3.5 and 1 per cent, respectively, of the geographical variation in these parties' levels of support, once the effects of social composition and region are controlled for (but upwards of 15.6 per cent of the variation in NDP support when region and social composition are not included). Urban zone had less impact on variation in Reform and Bloc support, and virtually zero effect on Liberal support. These results are compared to the much larger *r squared* values for the contribution made by the social composition variables, explaining between 11 and 75 per cent of the geographical variation in the vote across metropolitan constituencies, while region accounts for between 6 and 20 per cent. However, this research also shows that a sizable proportion of the variation in levels of support can only be explained when all three sets of variables are included in the models

TABLE 4
Effect of Zonal Residence on Party Vote, 1997 (OLS Regressions)

	Controlling for region only (A)					Controlling for region and social composition (B)				
	NDP	Liberal	PC	Reform	BQ	NDP	Liberal	PC	Reform	BQ
Constant	15.0	32.2	18.3	27.7	38.9	—	—	—	—	—
N =	298	299	298	226	72	298	299	298	226	72
R squared	0.54	0.48	0.49	0.88	0.06	0.83	0.68	0.90	0.97	0.97
Urban zone										
Inner cities	**5.6	***9.1	**−5.4	***−14.6	*−8.9	*4.0	—	***−5.9	—	—
Suburbs	**−3.1	***5.9	−0.2	*−3.1	−0.1	—	—	—	*2.3	—
Region										
Atlantic	***7.6	2.1	***15.9	***−16.1	Na	***6.5	−3.1	***21.8	***−16.9	Na
Quebec	***−12.5	1.0	***4.7	***−24.2	Na	***−19.4	**6.2	***−11.2	***−12.4	Na
Prairies	***13.1	−2.8	***−5.8	1.6	Na	***16.1	—	—	−2.1	Na
Alberta	***−9.1	***−7.9	**−4.1	***26.9	Na	**−5.7	***−7.1	**−4.0	***23.8	Na
BC	***4.3	***−7.0	***−11.4	***18.1	Na	**4.9	***−6.6	***−11.2	***15.0	Na
Composition (%)										
Gender—male						***1.33	***−1.09	—	—	—
Ages 18–24						—	—	—	—	***−9.45
Ages 25–34						***−1.30	*1.66	—	—	—
Ages 50–64						—	*1.78	—	−1.03	***3.76
Ages 65 +						—	—	—	—	***−1.26
Married						***−0.63	***0.89	—	***0.57	—
French at home						—	—	*0.04	**−0.12	***1.02
Other L at home						—	***0.25	−0.11	***−0.27	—
Edu U degree						—	*0.25	**−0.79	***−0.26	—
Recent immigrant						—	—	—	0.59	—
Visible minorities						—	—	0.12	*−0.23	**1.00
Aboriginal						—	—	—	—	***1.34
Jewish						—	*0.34	—	**−0.40	—
Manufact. wkrs						—	—	***0.48	—	—
Prof. / mgr. wks						—	—	***1.40	—	***−1.12
Gov. wkrs						—	*0.26	—	—	**−1.24
Self-employed						***−0.65	**−0.42	***0.67	***0.73	***−0.98
Unemployed						—	**0.70	**−0.41	—	—
Dwellings rented						—	**0.17	—	***0.13	—

Source: Calculated by the author from election results (from the Report of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada for the 1997 election). Social composition data from the 1996 census of Canada.
Notes: (A) Coefficients show the raw vote advantage of residential location in relation to the rest of Canada (rest of Quebec for the Bloc Québécois) after performing OLS regression. The constant can be read as the average proportion of the vote going to the party in question in constituencies outside of urban areas in the 'rest of Canada' (rest of Quebec for the Bloc Québécois).
(B) Coefficients show the raw vote advantage of residential location in relation to the rest of Canada (rest of Quebec for the Bloc Québécois) after performing backwards OLS regression and controlling for region and social composition. Only the variables that remain in the model after the backwards processing are shown. The models were run through the origin, with no constant requested. The *r square* measures for these results therefore cannot be compared to r square measures for models which include an intercept.
NDP = New Democratic party, PC = Progressive Conservative party, BQ = Bloc Québécois.
Sig. = *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001

TABLE 5

Estimates of the Contribution of Social Composition, Region, and Urban Zone Effects to City-Suburban Differences in Party Preferences, 1997 Election

	PC	Liberal	NDP	Reform	BQ	Other
1997 election results (% share)						
Inner cities	13.4	46.8	14.5	7.3	11.8	6.1
Suburbs	18.2	43.4	6.3	14.4	16.5	1.2
Adjusted 1997 results (factoring out the regression results for urban zone):						
Inner cities	19.3	45.5	10.5	7.1	11.5	6.1
Suburbs	18.7	44.6	6.5	12.1	16.9	1.2

Adjusted index values for city-suburban balance of federal party support, 1997:	PC	Liberal	NDP	Reform	BQ	Weighted average difference
Original index values (parity = 100)	135.8	92.7	43.4	197.3	139.8	—
Absolute difference from 100 (A)	35.8	7.3	56.6	97.3	39.8	7.780
Factoring out urban effects	96.8	97.6	61.6	170.0	147.2	—
Absolute difference from 100 (B)	3.2	2.4	38.4	70.0	47.2	4.876
Ratio of difference (B)/(A) =						0.627
Estimated contribution / effect on index differences in zonal balance of support:						
Urban zone =						37.3%
Social composition & region =						62.7%

Adjusted index values for ideological leaning, 1997:

	Inner cities	Suburbs	Difference
Original index values (A)	156.3	43.1	113.2
Factoring out urban effects (B)	143.8	76.0	67.8
Ratio of difference of (B)/(A) =			0.599
Estimated contribution / effect on city-suburban differences in ideological leaning:			
Urban zone =			40.1%
Social composition & region =			59.9%

Proportion of the geographical variation across constituencies in the largest metropolitan areas explained by each set of variables, 1997 (r squared values):

	PC	Liberal	NDP	Reform	BQ
Full model	0.702	0.792	0.697	0.916	0.961
Urban zone only	0.0095	0.00028	0.035	0.0069	0.0062
Region only	0.130	0.058	0.204	0.155	na
Social composition only	0.174	0.458	0.111	0.139	0.756
Interaction/combination effects	0.389	0.275	0.347	0.615	0.199
Only urban zone in the model:	0.069	0.010	0.156	0.114	0.077

Notes: The proportion of geographical variation across constituencies explained separately by each set of variables is calculated by subtracting from the *r squared* values for the full model the *r squared* values of the models estimated when each set of variables is removed.

(between 20 per cent and 62 per cent of the variation—here termed 'interaction/combination effects'). Thus, although the dichotomous urban zone variables may contribute relatively little on their own to constituency variation in party preferences (except perhaps in the case of the NDP), they may be important in the context of differences in support across regions or social characteristics. This points to the examination of interaction effects between urban zone and social composition (and, perhaps, region) as a potentially fruitful line of future research.

CONCLUSION

This article examined whether significant differences in federal voting behaviour can be found to exist between Canadian inner cities and suburbs throughout the postwar period. The results suggest that such differences are indeed present in aggregate party voting, but only from the early 1980s onwards. After this time, the votes of inner-city and suburban residents, particularly those for political parties on the extreme right and left of the Canadian spectrum, have increasingly diverged, with similar patterns across all three of Canada's largest urban regions. In particular, while inner-city residents remained on the left throughout the study period, suburban residents shifted to the right in their mix of votes.

Although social composition and region remain more important on the whole, regression analysis conducted on constituency-level data suggests that place of residence came to independently explain a portion of the difference in constituency-level vote shares between 1980 and 1997. The independent effects of place of residence explain upwards of 40 per cent of the aggregate difference in voting between cities and suburbs in 1997, although on its own, the urban zone effect would seem to account for only a small portion of the variation across space for each party. Differences in demographic composition appear to explain much of the remaining discrepancy, despite the fact that a slight majority of the variables analyzed reveal a decline in city-suburban disparities.

This research suggests that the city-suburban cleavage, while comparatively weaker than its better-known regional counterpart, is nonetheless a 'true' cleavage that cannot be completely reduced to the differences in social segregation or housing tenure, although it would seem amplified by them. The strongest effects are for NDP support in the inner cities, supporting the contention that the NDP is increasingly becoming an 'urban' party, at least at the federal level. Weaker yet notable effects are also found for parties of the right (producing a disadvantage for the PCs in the inner cities and a slight advantage to the Reform party in the suburbs). Such results are compatible with the possibility that city-suburban differences are increasingly ideologically structured (Walks, 2004a).

To be sure, more rigorous methodological inquiry will be needed to accurately determine the extent and importance of intra-urban geography for our understanding of federal political behaviour. Nonetheless, these results add further support for the existence of a modest, yet significant and apparently growing, political cleavage between inner-city and suburban residents. Such a political cleavage is all the more important considering that Canada continues to become increasingly urban, with virtually all new growth in population and thus in electoral districts occurring in the suburbs surrounding Canada's largest metropolitan areas (Walks, 2004b). The suburbs, particularly the outer suburbs, would appear to be maturing into a political force unto their own at the same time that they are diverging in their political values and party preferences. This has potential repercussions for the future direction of government policy, although it remains to be seen how the continued suburbanization of visible minorities, tenants and poverty (Bunting et al., 2004; Walks, 2001) will affect such a cleavage over time. This research demonstrates that intra-urban geography has implications for public policy and political representation, and thus needs to be factored into future analyses of Canadian political behaviour.

Notes

1 There is a precedent for NDP leaders representing inner-city ridings. David Lewis, leader of the NDP from 1971 to 1974, held the riding of York South-Weston, which straddles the border between the inner city and inner suburbs of Toronto. Alexa McDonough, NDP leader between 1995 and 2003, held the riding of Halifax, which covers the prewar portion of the Halifax region.

2 The only related reference is to Wiseman's suggestions that the NDP's win in 1990 represented a victory of "city over country," and his note that Bob Rae was the first premier to hail from Toronto (Wiseman, 1997: 431). Note, however, that this last point is not completely correct. George Drew, premier of Ontario from 1943 to 1948, for a time held the (old City of Toronto) seat of High Park.

3 A related argument is made by Fisher (1975; 1995), who hypothesizes that increasing metropolitan size and density should lead to a greater concentration of 'unconventional' behaviour and attitudes. However, as Fisher admits (1995: 546), his theory is ambivalent about suburbia. Importantly, subcultural theory does not provide a theoretical reason for expecting any city-suburban cleavage. Instead, subcultural theory suggests that the suburbs surrounding the largest metropolitan areas should come second only to central cities with respect to the concentration of unconventional behaviour.

4 This definition of the inner city is broader than those employed in the United States, which tend to restrict analyses to central and suburban municipalities. It should be noted that the author has also analyzed the data using the more restrictive definition based on municipal boundaries and found similar (though slightly weaker) results.

5 It is not completely clear how the Bloc Québécois should be categorized here. Although the Bloc generally votes to the left of the Liberals and is associated with the Parti Québécois and their quasi-social democratic policies, it was also formed out of the Quebec shell of the Progressive Conservative party and it attracted a number of PC

voters. Furthermore, Lucien Bouchard publicly stated at the time of the Bloc's formation that the Bloc was not to be associated with left or right, but with the goal of Quebec separation. For these reasons, it has not been categorized as a 'left-wing' party in this analysis. Analysis by the author suggests, however, that even if the Bloc were categorized here as a left-wing party, differences in the index of ideological leaning noted in this article would be very similar (though slightly weaker in 1993 and 1997).

6 Both this method and that employed by King (1997) will tend to underestimate the true effect of place of residence. In the OLS regression method employed here, coefficients over 1 indicate aggregation bias/ contextual effects, as no more than 100 per cent of the members of any particular social group can conceivably vote for each party. King's EI method has also been found to underestimate 'aggregation bias,' which would in this context include zone of residence effects (Cho, 1998).

7 Growing social composition effects in this case could either result from increasing spatial segregation based on gender, age, language, education, immigration status, ethnicity, occupation, employment status and tenure, or to shifts in political values/ ideology among social groups that are already segregated in space. The method employed here cannot distinguish between these latter two possibilities. For the purposes of this article, it is sufficient merely to show that urban zone has an important independent effect.

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