Since the mainstreaming of European populist parties, the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the European Union, and Donald Trump’s ascendance to the US presidency, political onlookers have proclaimed that a new “era of populism” is set to sweep away the prevailing neoliberal world order. Across the Western world, citizens have voted to turn inwards, rejecting internationalism and embracing nationalist parties and candidates on both extremes of the political spectrum. Marine Le Pen, candidate in the French ultra-right National Front party, is consistent with this global trend towards populist nationalism. Yet on April 23, Emmanuel Macron, an independent-centrist, defeated Le Pen in the first-round presidential election. Macron consolidated support from both of France’s mainstream parties, the Socialist Party and The Republicans Party, and political commentators favor him in the election’s final round on May 7.
If Macron defeats Le Pen on May 7, as polls and commentators suggest, France will demonstrate to the world that centrism and pro-European liberalism can still triumph over populism and nationalism. Macron’s independent-centrist party did not exist a year ago, yet it has achieved popular support among centrist voters who typically vote for Socialist Party candidates. The independent-centrist party thus appeals to French voters desire to disrupt the political status quo without tending towards either political extreme. This combination of novelty and centrism might enable Macron to push through an optimistic, pro-Europe platform, allowing France to retake the reins of directing common E.U. policy.
Yet Macron faces an uphill battle in the lead-up to the election’s final round, which will test his ability to reach across both sides of the political spectrum and appeal to more Eurosceptic voters. Despite his remarkable rise from relative obscurity to the political limelight, Macron’s twenty-four percent share of the vote in the first-round election was the lowest among leading first-round candidates since 2002. Macron’s low margin of victory could provide Le Pen an opportunity to unify disenchanted voters under her nativist-nationalist platform. This would be consistent with Trump’s performance in the American Electoral College, and the successful “Leave” campaign in the United Kingdom. Since their rise in prominence in 2015, ultra-right, populist candidates have defied all odds through their capacity to appeal to non-urban voters, who feel as though globalization and regional integration have left them on the wayside. Certainly Le Pen, with her nationalist, xenophobic rhetoric, plays into an anti-establishment narrative and speaks directly to these voters’ fears.
The National Front party represents overt affronts not only to the European Council, but also to its standing as an international governing body: a Le Pen victory would likely send France along a similar path as the United Kingdom in leaving the European Union. On August 30, 2015, when then Prime Minister Manuel Valls called the country’s lawmakers to action in Calais, to “treat, shelter and provide medical care to migrants in a dignified way,” Le Pen demanded he not “sacrifice Calais to the European Union dogmas” and “open the doors of our country to new illegal immigrants.” Le Pen’s support base, mirroring Trump’s in the United States, blames looser immigration laws and the globalist status quo for its economic subordination. Factory workers and manufacturers affected by E.U. policies that favor urban start-ups jeered Macron at a campaign stop in Amiens in northern France. To these voters, Macron represents the globalist establishment—the trade deals, open immigration policies, and urbanization that they view as threatening their lifestyles and livelihoods.
Macron may be able to capitalize on his position as third-party candidate, and particularly as an independent-centrist, to unify disenchanted voters behind a moderate, rather than extremist platform. Center-right voters, frustrated by five years of Socialist rule, view Marcon as a far more feasible negotiating partner than the fringe Le Pen. And though Macron’s ideology and background are by no means revolutionary—he supports loosening labor market restrictions, increasing public spending, and strengthening the European Union— his age, anti-establishment party position, and underdog background give him a novelty that ought to put him at a significant advantage in second round elections. Macron has increasingly adopted this revolutionary register, proclaiming his desire to “change the face of France” and telling his supporters they represent an “image of renewal.” If Macron wins on a successful globalist, pro-Europe platform, France will establish an important precedent across Western Europe and the United States, restoring much-needed confidence in global integration and international institutions.