Can a powerful Iran advance American national interests?
Former CIA officer Robert Baer’s new book, The Devil We Know: Dealing With The New Iranian Superpower, is sure to make waves. Baer contends the erratic Islamic Republic of 1979 has vanished; modern-day Iran may be secretive, but it is a rational, clever actor that harbors an “unshakable belief in its right to empire.” This sounds troubling, but as a powerful nation, Iran might prove a sound strategic ally to the United States, sounder than the ossified Saudi monarchy.
Using his deep knowledge of Middle Eastern history and his impressive rolodex, Baer crafts an absorbing narrative replete with interviews from both foot soldiers and leaders. The Devil We Know should be on policymakers’ reading lists, for its premise — Iran craves respect above all — is a compelling challenge to conventional wisdom.
Blueprint for Empire
Baer is not an extravagant writer, but his stark prose underscores the severity of the issue: Iran may be more formidable than hawks fear. The Shiite nation surreptitiously aids Sunni Hamas, convinces an autonomous Hezbollah to come under its wing, makes inroads into the Marxist PKK, signs energy deals with U.S.-allied Turkey and sustains de facto control over portions of Iraq, giving it tacit veto power on several foreign oil agreements.
When compared to hawks who seem more geared toward self-righteousness than empathy, our author’s ability to surmise the motives driving Iran’s aggression is laudable. First, Iran sees history entirely differently. As former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage remarked, “I fear their hegemonistic ambitions … They [don’t] see the days of Persepolis [as] 2500 years ago; they see it as yesterday.” Second, Iran perceives America’s activities as merely a new venture in colonialism.
No Need for Nukes?
Baer asserts that Iran does not value nuclear weapons over regional power parity with the United States. He posits that with its Silkworm missiles and nimble navy, Iran could easily close the Strait of Hormuz, sending petrol prices skyrocketing. Recent events may support this; when Iranian vessels confronted U.S. warships last June, oil prices spiked. Our author writes that given its asymmetrical warfare capabilities, “Iran sees a nuclear bomb as nice to have but not crucial.” Consequently, Iran harbors no ambitions of nuclear genocide and its President’s disturbingly anti-Semitic speeches are not indicative of national goals. (After all, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad does not even sit on the National Security Council chaired by Ayatollah Khamenei). Baer implies that although Tehran’s leadership sympathizes with Palestinians, it is more concerned with the anti-Shiite Saudis administering Mecca.
Grand Strategy
How should we treat the an assertive Iran? Baer is unequivocal: come to terms with its clout. War or expensive containment is unfeasible. Our author’s recommendations for joint security patrols in the gulf and synergic energy deals are sensible, but some other proposals require a leap of faith. Baer, channeling Samuel Huntington, recommends abandoning the legacy of the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement. The agreement’s arbitrary borders have proved disastrous, but officially redrawing the chaotic Middle East a century later along cultural lines would be arduous. Iraq alone, the most commonly discussed case for reorganization, is far more complex than the simplistic tripartite image portrayed in the media.
While Baer’s push for a two-state solution in Palestine to boost America’s image is already consensus amongst experts, his advice that we let Saudi Arabia fall into Iran’s orbit will roil the entrenched foreign policy establishment. Yet the radical nature of this proposal shouldn’t necessarily disqualify it. Baer demonstrates that Iran’s disciplined proxies act upon command, whereas the takfiris Saudi Arabia spawns are uncontrollable, partly because Sunni Islam lacks a tradition of clear hierarchy. This will not console suicide bombing victims, but nevertheless, we may be better off dealing with Tehran.
This book is unlikely to please neoconservatives intent on strong-arming Iran or liberal internationalists intent on the Wilsonian dream. And Baer’s suggestion that Iran, as the only other competent Middle Eastern nation, join Israel as America’s key ally, may sound outlandish but as he points out, few imagined Mao’s China could become the United States’ partner. If the apogee of Iranian power is coming, Baer’s call to exploit it may gain resonance. Indeed, Henry Kissinger recently said the United States should neither fear nor obstruct “a strong Iran.” Baer is cautious while proffering hand of friendship, however, for “Iran is never what it seems.”