What 44 can learn from 35
Pundits are fond of drawing comparisons between John F. Kennedy and Barack H. Obama and, indeed, there are many parallels to be found. Like JFK, Obama captured national attention as a junior senator and ran for president without a great deal of governing experience. Like JFK, Obama campaigned as a liberal Democrat committed to bringing change to Washington. Like JFK, Obama possesses a disarming ability to galvanize and inspire Americans with his rhetoric. And, like JFK, Obama is a young president who shares the White House with his children and sartorially idolized wife.
But somehow, in focusing on these superficial similarities, commentators have almost entirely neglected to draw meaningful and instructive connections between Presidents Kennedy and Obama’s transitions to power. More nuanced reflection on the 1960-1961 Eisenhower-Kennedy transition, and especially the Bay of Pigs invasion, reveals lessons that Obama would do well to heed throughout the remainder of his transition.
In the realm of foreign policy, Kennedy’s first 100 days are remembered as a disaster. JFK’s first major national security decision, to launch the Bay of Pigs invasion, ended in perfect failure. When Kennedy took office, he inherited a CIA plan to overthrow Fidel Castro, including a few thousand Cuban exiles secretly training in Guatemala. Wary of reneging on his campaign promise to support democratic anti-Castro forces in exile, Kennedy authorized continuation and acceleration of the preparations in late January. JFK was never fully comfortable with the operation, however, and he demanded modifications to make it “quieter” and “less spectacular.” He wanted to maintain plausible deniability of American involvement. Ultimately, the CIA convinced the president that they had a plan that could work and on April 16, 1961, a Cuban exile brigade landed at the Bay of Pigs. Within four days, 89 of the invaders were killed, and 1,197 were taken prisoner.
After the Bay of Pigs debacle, Kennedy asked his close advisor Theodore Sorensen, “How could I have been so stupid to let them go ahead?” The various answers to this question offer valuable lessons for President Obama, as he crafts a foreign policy and reckons with the many covert programs — only some of which are publicly known — passed on by the Bush administration.
First, beware inherited policies. The new administration should neither a priori accept nor a priori reject programs inherited from the prior administration. Kennedy made the mistake of carrying out the Bay of Pigs invasion partially because Eisenhower told him it was his “responsibility.” While it is unlikely Obama will do anything just because Bush told him to, he must be aware of the challenges of continuing inherited policies. All major policy initiatives should be subject to a strategic review in which the Obama administration ensures the policy’s assumptions align with their envisioned strategy and objectives.
Second, always ask critical questions, especially to military and intelligence experts. As Kennedy reflected after the Bay of Pigs, “If someone comes in to tell me this or that about the minimum wage bill, I have no hesitation in overruling them. But you always assume that the military and intelligence people have some secret skill not available to ordinary mortals.” Obama, who assumed the position of commander-in-chief with less military experience than Kennedy, should be wary of deferring to expertise, especially on such complex questions as “AfPak,” Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and the War on Terror.
Third, be willing to modify campaign commitments. During his long path to the presidency, Obama made many statements on foreign policy. Though his political capital may suffer, the president must be willing to revise, and even reverse, these statements. Since a president does not have full access to intelligence until January 20, it is critical that his policy positions reflect the best available information, rather than commitments made with incomplete information during the campaign and pre-inaugural transition. Kennedy made a serious mistake in allowing campaign statements to dictate his Cuba policy once in office, and Obama should be careful not to do the same.
President Obama must keep this advice in mind as he re-charts America’s course in Iraq and Afghanistan, and defines the next stage in the War on Terror. But the lessons of the Bay of Pigs are not limited to foreign policy; in effectively responding to the financial crisis, Obama’s success will equally depend on avoiding these transition pitfalls.