I don’t think history has in any sense “returned”; as Robert Kagan has suggested of the recent conflict in Georgia, but merely has become more difficult for us to ignore. In retrospect, it seems foolishly naive that anyone could have ever believed it had ended. Rather than represent any particular “new reality”, this invasion has merely cast in relief the realities of our world system as it really was. In the theater of the Democratic National Convention, and McCain’s nomination of Sarah Palin, the fact remains that the recent events in Georgia are far more significant indications of what the world under our next President might look like. It has, as well, revealed some unfortunate truths about the feelings of the American public, government, and military, that might bode poorly for our attempts to maintain international order.
One persistent misconception, and a common one, is that Russian aggression represents a return to the “bad old days” of the Soviet Union. The Russian action in Georgia bears little resemblance to the Soviet world, and has far more in common with the acts, and rationales, of the pre-Soviet tsardom. A cursory reading of Russian history will reveal countless instances of imperial aggression masked under the claims of protecting the rights of Russians abroad. It was no different this time, with Russia basing its claim on the violation of the right to self-determination by oppressed minorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. After the tanks rolled in, the Russians made the newly-possible move of granting citizenship to those minorities, placing a foot in the door for future interventions on more legally defensible ground.
This has less in common with the Soviet policies that led to the invasions of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which were based on more explicit imperialist and political goals, ensuring Communist Party dominion. Ostensibly, at least, the Soviet Union was in fact engaged in a wholly humanitarian intervention. What’s more, it was cloaked in the very language of humanistic concerns that the United States so often uses to justify its own questionable actions abroad. I am surprised that this (wholly intentional) moral ambiguity has not given more people pause. Because despite the contrast between peaceful, democratic Georgia and aggressive, autocratic Russia, the Russians have some points. The people of Abkhazia and South Ossetia certainly had rejected Georgian rule, and the Georgian occupation could only be described as “imperialistic”. And Russia did, for all the devastation it has wrought, protect the rights of those oppressed minorities. It does bear resemblance, as the Russians pointed out, to the West’s forceful liberation of Kosovo, right down to the anger it caused the other side.
Furthermore, Russia’s action abroad are met with a broad grant of legitimacy and approval from the Russian public. Many saw it as a brave move stepping in to protect the rights of Russian or pro-Russian minorities abroad. They believe that Russians outside Russia have suffered substantially since the collapse of the Soviet Union at the hands of xenophobic governments in the post-Soviet Republics (Ukraine, the Baltic States, and Central Asia). And this sentiment contains within it more than a grain of truth. Aggression in the “near abroad” would be supported by its own citizens, and would be hard to restrict by the international community given its similarity with unilateral American intervention in Iraq, or NATO interventions in the Balkans.. The more historically minded might remember that World War I originally began because of Russia’s pledge to protect the Serbs.
However, the world is quite different now (thankfully) than Tsarist times. Interestingly, one similarity might account for the difference: the Russia then, as of now, was economically dependent on the international export trade in raw commodities. The chaos of World War I destroyed their livelihood, and their government as well. With Russia’s current absolute dependence on exported oil, they could never afford international disorder, or the fracturing of the international trade system. The Russian leaders today are totally aware of that. And with an elderly population and lack of a internationally threatening military, Russia would be an odd superpower, possessing only two real powers, their economic nuclear option or the real nuclear option. Any attempt to take on the West would be national suicide. The fungibility of oil means that Russia attempting to turn off the oil spigot would hurt them far more than anyone else.
So let’s take comfort in the small things, that we are not returned to the dark ages of the Cold War. This is a new world, and one where it is more difficult to paint clear opposing sides. When we look towards the future, we must rethink what is truly in the national interest of the United States, and even more so, what is right. Considering the case of Georgia, the strategic case not to intervene was clear, and is largely shared. But it seems there was as clear a consensus that to do so would have been the morally correct move. In this, it seems as though the willful ignorance of the Cold War, at least, is back.
– Alex Copulsky, Books & Arts Editor