Despite receiving a warm welcome last week in Tehran, the announced framework for a nuclear deal between the United States and Iran has an uncertain fate. Although mainstream media coverage has extensively analyzed the implications for Middle Eastern security, less discussed is the pivotal role of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, described as the “single most powerful institution in Iran,” in the deal’s outcome. The IRGC’s broad economic power has seeped into the political sector, making it a key player in any and all Iranian negotiations. The organization dominates major economic sectors, including energy, construction, telecommunications, automaking, banking, and finance. Indeed, many have argued that international sanctions on Iran’s economy only serve to benefit the IRGC, whose access to state funds give it a decisive edge over its competitors. It cannot be mistakenly assumed that talks about the nuclear deal will pass over the Guard; instead, commentators must acknowledge the tremendous pressure Iran’s leaders face from the IRGC as they pursue negotiations.
Interestingly, although the IRGC may benefit from sanctions, the organization’s leader, General Mohammad Ali Jafari, has publicly endorsed the nuclear deal as a victory in Iran’s “diplomatic jihad.” A strong sense of nationalism seems to take precedence over other agendas, as the IRGC’s support of the deal remains tentative. This ambivalence within the guard stems in part from its strong allegiance to Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has approved the deal, provided that all sanctions are lifted immediately upon its implementation. Upon the announcement of the deal, Jafari lauded “the revolutionary children of Islamic Iran [for succeeding in] defending the rights of the Iranian nation.” Yet many fear that the IRGC’s involvement has increased the stakes of the deal; Israeli television has released rumors of the IRGC “preparing for war” if negotiations do not come to fruition by June 30. Unsurprisingly, the prospect of a military strike holds major implications for the Islamic Republic, a detail that should not go unnoticed by U.S. leaders as discussion progresses.
What is surprising, however, is the willingness of the Revolutionary Guards to comply with those who wish to continue negotiations, as generally the IRGC tends to denounce any compromise or concession to the West as “dangerous to their ideology.” By portraying the deal as the result of Iran’s political labors and as a reflection of the state’s growing power, the IRGC is able to retain its traditional nationalist stance while at the same time advocating for the relaxation of sanctions. Jafari and his Deputy IRGC Commander Salami referred to the country’s “diplomacy of resistance” and “defense capabilities” as chief sources of weight behind Iran’s political influence in negotiations.
The Revolutionary Guard may loom over Iranian politics as an underlying source of influence, but that does not automatically render it an impediment to diplomatic negotiation and compromise. This deal is a rare opportunity for the United States to improve relations with Iran, as the influential IRGC rarely makes such concessions to the West. U.S. actions in the near future, however, must not be made hastily, as the IRGC’s position is one of tentative, hesitant support. It is worth noting that in response to President Obama’s live, broadcasted speech, the atmosphere of celebration in Tehran was immediately followed by one of hesitation. The United States must realize this instability and act honestly and responsibly, appeasing the IRGC without conceding too much too soon.