On July 15, bystanders in Turkey’s capital, Ankara, and its largest city, Istanbul, witnessed low flying fighter jets and helicopters, heard sporadic gunfire, and looked on as military tanks took to the streets and highways. Given Turkey’s long, storied history of military intervention in political affairs, many jumped to the conclusion that the military was attempting a coup against the AKP government of former prime minister and incumbent president Recep Tayyip Erdogan. After Prime Minister Binali Yildirim confirmed the military activity was indeed an attempted coup, onlookers around the Western world considered its inevitable international ramifications, looking to the United States to take a decisive stance.
As the putsch was underway, the White House released a statement affirming that President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry would stand by “the democratically elected government of Turkey.” The White House’s decision to support President Erdogan and his government was not necessarily an easy one: Erdogan has long proven a stubborn and reluctant ally of the United States. An increasingly authoritarian Erdogan presidency will further complicate U.S.-Turkey relations. Despite these inevitable challenges, the United States prioritized stability and pragmatic diplomacy and affirmed its commitment to supporting democratically elected governments abroad. In opposing the attempted coup, the Obama administration provided important clarity for critics who have long decried its often incoherent and poorly articulated foreign policy strategy.
Turkey, a member of NATO, straddles Europe and the Middle East. It is a center of relative stability in an ever-volatile region and, most recently, an invaluable partner in the U.S.-led fight against the Islamic State. A stable Turkey is a prerequisite to maintaining U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East. Last year, as the U.S.-led coalition’s fight against ISIS intensified, the United States looked to Turkey to lend strategic military bases along the Syrian border and to lead in the effort to stop the flow of foreign terrorist fighters into Iraq and Syria. Under Erdogan’s leadership, Turkey had provided tacit support for ISIS, since its success led to a weakened Kurdish separatist movement led by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK. Erdogan’s eventual decision to join the coalition against ISIS was heralded as a turning point in the fight against the terror group.
The United States has openly criticized Erdogan for his recent attempts to consolidate power, his crackdown on civilian protesters, and his censorship of journalists and citizens publishing or expressing views critical of his government. Erdogan has defended his clampdown on journalists as a bulwark against terrorism—he insisted the “supposed journalists” were tied to the PKK. But the United States’ criticisms have always been cautiously put forth, as alienating Erdogan and his supporters would deal a blow to the United State’s strategic agenda in the Middle East and isolate a key NATO member state.
Since Mustafa Kemal (or “Ataturk”) founded the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the military has assumed the role of protecting a secular Kemalist legacy against any attempts at the Islamization of Turkish society. Erdogan has to a large extent subverted Turkey’s secular republican underpinnings by silencing critics, re-introducing Islamic principles in the public sphere, assuming control over the judiciary, and instituting reforms that legalize his continued executive position in government. However, a coup is inherently undemocratic, and this one certainly came across as an archaic means of defending Turkey’s founding values. Erdogan’s brand of “democracy” may be pseudo-democratic, but critics cannot deny that his government was democratically elected and that a military coup threatens the significant steps Turkey has made towards adopting a more inclusive democracy.
The Turkish president has already used the failed coup to his own advantage, purging his opponents by arresting thousands of police officers, banning military helicopters from taking off in Istanbul, and strengthening his stranglehold on the Turkish judiciary system. These power grabs will only further complicate the United States’s often tenuous relationship with President Erdogan. This is unlikely the last time the United States will find itself between a rock and a hard place regarding Turkey, with the broader international community as its audience.