Former National Security Advisor on U.S. policy in the Middle East
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski is the former National Security Advisor to President Carter and is considered a realist in foreign policy. He is currently a professor at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. Recently, Dr. Brzezinski spoke with the HPR about his perspectives on current geopolitical challenges.
Harvard Political Review: You helped shape U.S. foreign policy during the initial Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In hindsight, do you think that American assistance to the Mujahedeen made sense in the context of the Cold War?
Zbigniew Brzezinski: It made complete sense. First of all, it precipitated the fall of the Soviet Union, and you can only imagine what the world would be like today if the Soviet Union still existed. They were then training terrorists for action all over the world, but the collapse of the Soviet Union was a blessing for international peace. Secondly, the fact that we helped the Afghans made it easy for us after 9/11 to come in and overthrow the Taliban. The Russians could not conquer Afghanistan with 160,000 troops. We sent in 300 Special Forces, that’s all — 300. But because the Afghans were very grateful and sympathetic to the United States, we overthrew the Taliban in Afghanistan practically without too much effort. The pity is in the subsequent seven years under Bush we wasted that opportunity by a policy that simultaneously was too ambitious and inept.
HPR: Going forward in Afghanistan, what should America’s strategy be? Do you think the Obama administration will fundamentally change or use the previous approach to Afghanistan?
ZB: The Obama administration is currently reappraising the strategy, and my hope is that it will come out with a sensible diagnosis. My only wish is that we should avoid the mistake that the Russians made. The Russians went into Afghanistan thinking it would be easy picking. … We are relying on some democratic Afghans in the pursuit of a more modern and democratic Afghan state, to be achieved both by a military presence as well as by economic assistance. In my view, that is too ambitious a goal. Our main objective ought to be the Taliban. … The domestic flavor of any Afghan government is the business of the Afghans themselves. Accordingly, in my view, our policies should aim at limited accommodations wherever possible with those elements of the Taliban which are prepared to make a total break with Al-Qaeda, offer Al-Qaeda no shelter, expel it, or eliminate it. If that happens, then the rest of the story is up to the Afghans.
HPR: In light of the February 2009 Israeli elections, how should President Obama speak to broker an Israeli or Palestinian peace accord? Does Israel’s failure to subdue Hamas represent a military or a political problem?
ZB: Hamas is a political reality, which cannot be subdued or ignored, just like the extreme right wing in Israel is a political reality that cannot be eliminated or ignored. The fact is that both the Israelis and Palestinians are unable to reach peace on their own, and therefore the United States, as a fair mediator, has to step into the breach and push forward the peace process by outlining at least the basic framework for what a genuine peace deal should entail. More specifically, the President should put on the record that it is the position of the United States that a peace treaty between the two sides has to entail at least the following four fundamental principles. One: no right of return for Palestinian refugees to Israel because Israel cannot be expected to commit suicide for peace. That is a very bitter pill for the Palestinians to swallow. Two: Jerusalem has to be genuinely shared. The Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem and the Israeli capital in West Jerusalem, the old city, shared jointly. That is a bitter pill for the Israelis, but without that there would be no peace or reconciliation. Three: the ’67 lines, with some changes in them, to accommodate large urban Israeli settlements, but with one-for-one territorial compensation in the Yekev and the Galilee. And four: a militarized Palestinian state, and I would even urge an American military presence on the Jordan River so that Israel has a sense of security in regards to strategic depth.
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