Georgia’s troubles in the aftermath of the Ossetia conflict
The South Ossetia conflict last August was a tragic farce that ran its full course in barely a week, inviting paraphrasing Porfirio Diaz’s saying about Mexico; poor Georgia, so far from God and so close to Russia! In days, it re-established Russian superiority in the Caucasus and ignominiously ended the Bush-era afterglow of the ‘Color Revolutions’ and American-affiliated democratization.
Led by Mikheil Saak’ashvili, Georgia’s government has become more and more sclerotic and hostile to any opposition, in ways uncannily similar to the authoritarian government Saak’ashvili himself overthrew. The United States is unlikely to force the Soviet Union to loosen its grip, and even neighboring Azerbaijan is chiefly interested in cooperation with Russia. Indeed, the global financial crisis, which has hit both countries hard, may prove to be the only threat to Russia’s quiet dominance in the region.
The war itself saw a number of substantive changes to the region, despite the lack of obvious boundary shifts. Russia had previously formally recognized Georgia’s full territorial boundaries, but after their victory in the August 2008 conflict, now maintains significant military forces within the breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia — and while these countries have recognition only from their protector, as well a quixotic recognition by Nicaragua, there is now practically no prospect for Georgian absorption of its lost territories. As Oksana Antonenko of the International Institute for Strategic Studies told the HPR, “From the point of view of the prospects of a negotiated outcome… a lot of options have been effectively put off the table.”
Saakashvili Weakened
Beyond military calculations, the more significant change in the Caucasus may be the shattering of Saakashvili’s image and power. The murkiness of the border clashes during the war and the repressions of the Georgian government have lessened enthusiasm in the West — and particularly in Europe — for a man once seen as a plucky poster-child for democratization. “I think there has been a substantive change in the Western perception of Georgia,” said Antonenko, suggesting that options such as bringing Georgia into NATO are no longer up for discussion. An orderly change of leadership is unlikely, however, with most opposition figures marginalized and most media in the hands of the government. Moreover, even a successful opposition campaign might not lead to normalized relations with Russia, since advocating the abandonment of South Ossetia or Abkhazia would mean the end of any Georgian politician’s public ambitions.
From whence might assistance come? The United States is one of a rapidly shrinking number still eager for alignment with Georgia. Ariel Cohen, Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation told the HPR, America “should do everything possible to reverse Russian aggression against Georgia,” including diplomatic and economic measures. However, the current administration is not placing Caucasus power plays high on its agenda; Cohen said that “the Obama Administration seems to be rushing ahead with a “carrots-and-cakes” approach to the Kremlin,” with a much greater eye toward currying favor than engaging in strategic competition.
Closer to home, Georgia’s neighbor and fellow post-Soviet state, Azerbaijan, is also unlikely to prove a bulwark of support in these trying times. Azerbaijan has remained in good relations with Russia over the past months, with one key goal being Russian support for their efforts to reclaim Nagorno-Karabakh, a region, among others, controlled largely by Armenia since a 1994 war. While tensions remain between Russia and Azerbaijan, particularly over energy concerns including the Baku-Tibilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which provides Europe with an alternative to the Russian energy hegemony, it seems that cooperation is viewed as Baku’s best bet. “They are determined, as I heard from the Azeri Foreign minister, to avoid being put in a situation where Russia views them as an enemy,” said Antonenko.
A Way Forward?
It may seem that Putin’s gambit has proven altogether successful, and indeed even the recent economic crash, fueled by a collapsing energy sector and financial woes on a massive scale, will not be able to reverse the gains of 2008. After all, the much-costlier conflict in Chechnya has never gone unattended, no matter the resources of the Russian state. But a Russian withdrawal or compromise would not damage Russian territorial integrity, and might prove a good bargaining chip with the West in case of need. The continuing standoff leaves open one likely path for normalization in the Caucasus: policy or even regime change in Georgia agrees to set aside its ethnic and national self-determination demands as part of a greater compromise. This outcome would be similar to the position of the Boris Tadić government in Serbia, where Kosovo’s de facto independence has been accepted. Such an outcome appears more and more likely to emerge from the increasingly weak and friendless governments on both sides of the mountains, whose nationalist posturing has become increasingly absurd in light of their failure to produce economic results. Whichever way the conflict is resolved, however, the ultimate shape of any deal will be decided in Moscow, not in Tbilisi, nor in Washington.