My friend Chris Oppermann doesn’t think he should vote, largely because he believes his votes don’t have any consequences. Sarah Siskind thinks he’s wrong, largely because she believes that votes do more than Chris thinks. But there’s a deeper question here: must an action have consequences for it to possess moral value?
The answer, I think, is no. There are many actions we consider morally valuable, even when they have little or no consequence. Such actions are intrinsically valuable, or their goodness consists in their being suitably related to a deeper moral ideal or principle we find compelling. Suppose I make a promise to my grandmother that I will visit her grave once every year. It seems that honoring this promise is morally valuable, irrespective of the positive consequences doing so may bring about. It is valuable because promises are simply the sort of thing that it is right to honor.
Another example: imagine that you are a comedy troupe holding auditions for two available spots in your group. The two top candidates happen to be Asian, while the other three candidates happen to be black. If you choose based on acting ability, you will select the two Asian candidates. If you choose based on your prejudice towards black people, you will still select the two Asian candidates. The consequences are the same, whatever the process, but the first process is clearly better than the second. This is because, among other things, choosing based on racism is inherently wrong. It is also wrong, in many cases, because of the negative consequences for people of certain races. But part of the wrongness has nothing to do with consequences at all.
So Chris should not refrain from voting because his vote will do nothing consequential. Voting may be morally good, perhaps even morally obligatory, even if it has no tangible consequence. Here’s an argument to that effect that, at the least, seems quite plausible. The functioning of democratic institutions requires that a substantial portion of the populace vote as best as it can. So the populace, collectively, is under an obligation to vote. Since failing to fulfill one’s part of a collective obligation is wrong, each member of the populace should inform herself and then vote. This line of reasoning, of course, rests on the premise that we are required to do our part in discharging collective obligations. That premise requires more argument to firmly establish. But I suspect it is true, and the reason why is similar to the reason that promises must be kept, in that both involve an ideal of interpersonal responsibility rather than a calculation of consequences. That ideal of responsibility is a compelling one, and it plays a big part in our moral thinking. We should think long and hard before jettisoning it in favor of a crude consequentialism. And this notion of interpersonal responsibility is perfectly compatible with Chris’ skepticism about obligations to the state—Chris can think of the obligation as to his countrymen rather than his country, if he wishes. (I confess I don’t completely understand Chris’ reasoning here. When we talk about obligations to America, for example, aren’t we ultimately talking about obligations to Americans future and present?)
Of course, there’s another reason Chris thinks he shouldn’t vote: even if votes did count, his decision to refuse to vote would register “as a ‘vote’ against the reigning political establishment.” What’s interesting here is that the logic of this second reason defeats the logic of the first. Chris’ refusal to vote has even less consequence than whatever consequence voting may have: neither Democrats nor Republicans have ever changed their ways because some citizens refuse to vote for either, and such refusal has never decreased either party’s power. But Chris still thinks that not voting is better than voting, because he believes that supporting one of two failed parties is undesirable. If he’s correct, this undesirability clearly has nothing to do with the consequences, since there are no actual consequences of offering such support to either party. Moreover, failing to vote doesn’t “delegitimize both” of the major parties; it takes away the ability to participate in the one institution, the electoral system, capable of making that sort of statement. If Chris wants to delegitimize the major parties he should vote for Ralph Nader or Ross Perot.
Chris points out, finally, that there are many ways to participate in political and civic life besides voting. In some cases he thinks those other ways are more valuable. But voting takes an hour or two at most, on a few days of the year. Chris can vote and have ample time to do whatever other civic-minded things he likes. Given how many people there are in this country, most of those things are likely to have little import. Chris still seems to think he should do them, which should tell him something.
photo credit: blogs.houstonpress.com