September 12, 2001. On that day, millions of Americans woke up shaken, wondering who or what could have been responsible for the murder of thousands. In the weeks that followed, the terrorist organization al Qaeda declared responsibility, a claim verified by the U.S. government.
In the ensuing War on Terror, the United States and its allies have pursued al Qaeda and its affiliates, devastating their operational capacities and killing or capturing key leadership, including Osama bin Laden in May 2011. Despite the immense cost of this campaign to the United States and its allies in both blood and treasure, al Qaeda still exists—and in some places thrives—continuing to pose a threat to the United States, Israel, and other Western targets.
In addition to the threat posed by the United States, al Qaeda is now locked in a power struggle against its own Iraqi ex-affiliate. Al Qaeda has been outmaneuvered—usurped by the Islamic State as the world’s foremost terrorist organization. It is now fighting to regain that mantle, though its strategy moving forward is not clear. IS’s foremost strategic asset is its organizational and ideological divergence from al Qaeda. Throughout IS’s rise and ensuing dominance of global jihad, al Qaeda’s foremost objection to the movement has been what it perceives as ideological illegitimacy. But al Qaeda’s capitalization on IS’s innovations through imitation would be to lend legitimacy to the organization—a self-defeating strategy.
The Ideological Threat
The Islamic State (or Daesh, as its detractors prefer) has had a long history of bad blood with al Qaeda’s central leadership. Preceding its divorce from al Qaeda, the group incurred the wrath of al Qaeda Central with its persecution of Shi’a Muslims and its unilateral incorporation of al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra. Through these years of differences, al Qaeda Central consistently rebuked its unruly affiliate, while always attempting reconciliation. However, al Qaeda Central’s patience ended in February 2014, its leader Ayman al Zawahiri formally disavowed the group.
In June the ex-affiliate, by then stylizing itself as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, shocked the world. Capitalizing on the chaos unleashed by the Syrian Civil war, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi unilaterally declared an Islamic caliphate. His invocation of the caliphate hearkened back to the golden days of Islam, and implied the Islamic State’s dominion over all Muslims worldwide. Without consulting al Qaeda Central on the theological ramifications of reestablishing the caliphate, Baghdadi had executed a move with profound religious implications. As caliph, Baghdadi positioned himself to accept the allegiance of all Sunni Muslims, who under this theological interpretation would be required to renounce all loyalties—including to states and other jihadi organizations—and travel to live under the new government. Under this system, there was no place for al Qaeda.
Both IS and al Qaeda subscribe to Jihadi-Salafism, a pre-modern and radical interpretation of Islam. IS and al Qaeda conceptualize the world as a perpetual struggle of Islamic civilization against Western imperialists and the Arab governments they support. Ultimately, both organizations seek to galvanize a worldwide uprising of Muslims to reestablish the lost caliphate.
Many experts refer to al Qaeda’s vision of their jihadist ambitions as “nihilistic:” a continual struggle against Western imperialism, culminating in the far-off establishment of the caliphate. Most al Qaeda members do not expect to see the rise of the caliphate in their lifetimes, and instead see their mission as laying the groundwork for its eventual creation. Conversely, with Baghdadi’s declaration of the caliphate, IS leapfrogged al Qaeda’s entire struggle, essentially invalidating its justification for existence. Though there are other theological differences between the two organizations, this split over the legitimacy of the caliphate is by far the most significant. After all, the mere existence of IS poses an existential threat to al Qaeda.
This stark divergence in ideology is critical in shaping each group’s strategy. Unlike IS, al Qaeda never aspired to seize land from which it could enrich itself. Instead, it is singularly an international terrorist organization. Al Qaeda divides the world into the “near” enemy of Arab governments and apostate, non-Sunni Muslims, and the “far” enemy of Western imperialist powers and Israel. Though al Qaeda Central and its affiliates have led bloody insurgencies against fellow Arabs in the past, the organization prefers to target the “far” enemy through international terror plots and has previously rebuked attacks on the “near” enemy that targeted civilians. For example, IS’s predecessor al Qaeda in Iraq incurred the ire of Zawahiri over its targeting of Shi’a Muslims during the height of sectarian violence in Iraq around 2005-2006.
The Strategic Benefits of the Caliphate
Since abandoning its allegiance to al Qaeda, IS has diversified and strengthened its operations, launching a dual insurgency and terror campaign with a scale and sophistication beyond any of al Qaeda’s previous efforts. Importantly, IS’ dual insurgency-terrorist ambitions have created a critical opportunity for IS to distinguish itself from al Qaeda, boosting its competitiveness in the power struggle.
Territorial acquisition is supremely important to both IS operations and legitimacy. IS now regards itself as a caliphate. As such, it has taken to governing its captured territories and raising funds by levying taxes and seizing oil, antiquities, and slaves from local populations to support its activities. Though there are reasons to doubt the long-term viability of this funding strategy, IS’s diversity of funding sources is novel amongst jihadist groups. It has become the world’s richest terror organization. Al Qaeda, because of its secretive nature, can never hope to compete.
In addition to the accumulation of finances, IS’s possession of territory lends legitimacy to its recruitment of foreign fighters. In Syria and Iraq, IS has recruited local and foreign militants (the latter of which total more than 27,000) into an insurgency to control broad swaths of territory in both countries. Admittedly, al Qaeda Central is a secretive terrorist organization—not an insurgency—that probably would have neither the capacity nor the need for thousands of foreign recruits. That said, the number of fighters flocking to IS is higher than the numbers recruited when either al Qaeda or the Taliban were opposing the U.S. invasion of Iraq or the U.S. and Soviet invasions of Afghanistan. This unprecedented phenomenon is at least an indication of the enthusiasm of jihadists worldwide for the new experiment.
To recruit these fighters, IS has employed a slick combination of English and other foreign language publications and relentless Internet campaigns—primarily through social media. In its propaganda efforts, IS constructs a glamorous image of itself as a righteous, divinely ordained group. Foreign recruits are manipulated into believing that participation in the Islamic State is a “defense of their faith.” IS’s message is one of agency and invincibility, making it a huge draw for alienated and disaffected Muslims around the world—not just those radicalized during the course of the Syrian Civil War. Additionally, unlike past jihadist groups, the proto-state structure of IS requires it to recruit not just young male fighters, but also women as brides for the jihadists, along with social media propagandists, engineers, doctors, and construction workers.
Competing for Hearts and Minds
The Islamic State’s declaration of a caliphate guarantees its ability to dominate al Qaeda in both fundraising and recruitment. In addition to the success of its insurgency, the Islamic State has actively sought to replace al Qaeda as the foremost global jihadi terror organization. Around the world, IS is dominating the competition for the hearts and minds of the world’s jihadists and their sympathizers.
This competition carries into the online space. For years, jihadist groups have used online platforms for debate: first in heavily moderated chat rooms and now primarily though under-moderated social media. From these online platforms, experts can approximate global jihadi public opinion. Much of the conversation centers around the rival legitimacy claims of each group. According to J.M. Berger, an IS analyst, George Washington University Program on Extremism fellow, and co-author of “ISIS: The State of Terror,” the tide of opinion is with the Islamic State. As these discussions show, al Baghdadi’s declaration of the caliphate fractured global jihadist unity by exposing fault lines between al Qaeda’s and IS’s rival ideologies and strategies. Each group uses different ideological ammunition: al Qaeda blasts IS for its targeting of fellow Muslims, while IS accuses al Qaeda of theological impurity.
Perhaps most indicative indicator of each group’s influence, however, is the cohesion and expansion of its affiliates. The unity and expansion al Qaeda and IS partners signals the persuasiveness of each group’s rhetoric, and also indicates their respective abilities to facilitate international terror plots.
In order to advance its capacity for international terrorism, IS has constructed an affiliate system mirroring al Qaeda’s. Currently, al Qaeda is composed of several main branches: al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al Shabaab in Somalia, Jabhat al Nusra in Syria, and a newly established branch in the Indian Peninsula (though it has struggled to gain traction). In addition to these main affiliates, al Qaeda maintains relations with smaller cells throughout Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. IS, meanwhile, has expanded its territorial claim by establishing administrative “provinces” in Egypt, Libya, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Russia, and Nigeria. Additionally, IS wields much influence among jihadis in Bangladesh, Tunisia, and Somalia, where it has recently launched attacks.
Because the Islamic State’s legitimacy is tied entirely to its claim of the caliphate, each expansion reifies its ideological goal of domination. According to J.M. Berger, “groups who hold territory become centers of gravity” for recruits and ideological dominance. Therefore, the continued expansion of IS poses a direct challenge to al Qaeda.
IS and its affiliates have, thus far, surpassed al Qaeda in plotting and carrying out regional and international terrorist attacks. The carnage of the November 2015 Paris attacks, particularly, has left Western governments struggling to respond. Lone-wolf attacks inspired by IS ideology, such as the San Bernardino shootings, have popped up as well.
The al Qaeda Response
It is no exaggeration to say that al Qaeda is now at a crossroads. The organization is in direct competition with IS in recruiting fighters and followers, achieving ideological dominance, and conducting global terrorist attacks. IS is currently outperforming the older organization across all of these measures.
It seems that there is little al Qaeda can do to reclaim its former dominant position. Much of the Islamic State’s draw comes from its identity as an insurgency and territorial power, and because al Qaeda’s primary objection to IS’ legitimacy has been over its claim to govern territory, it’s stuck to its current model.
Al Qaeda’s response to the rising threat posed by IS seems glacial in comparison to the rapidity of IS’s rise. Even in his denunciations of IS, Zawahiri has continually implored jihadists (including IS members) to focus not on infighting, but on banding together to oppose the “far enemy:” the Western imperialists operating in Libya, Syria, Mali, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Perhaps Zawahiri is biding his time and awaiting IS’s eventual demise in the form of an international military campaign created to defeat the group. Perhaps Zawahiri’s immense security precautions, are impeding his counter-campaign. After all, he has already shown himself to be a cautious successor to Osama bin Laden. Whatever the case, al Qaeda’s relative inaction remains puzzling.
Even in the midst of a great power competition, however, it is important to remember that al Qaeda is not going away—in fact, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Jabhat al Nusra have both grown as the Yemeni and Syrian civil wars drag on. Additionally, as Berger reminds, although most new foreign recruits are diverting to IS, “the rising tide in global jihadist recruitment has lifted all boats.” Al Qaeda is indeed continuing to draw recruits and cash. And with its affiliates’ recent plots against French satire magazine Charlie Hebdo in January 2015 and attacks leaving dozens dead in western hotels in Mali and Burkina Faso, al Qaeda has proven itself capable of posing a continued, formidable threat.
The future of the al Qaeda-IS rivalry is far from certain. What is certain, however, is the continued threat posed to global peace and security by both of the notorious groups.
Image source: Youtube/Syria & Iraq News