Throughout the 19th century, the United Kingdom and Russia engaged in the so-called “Great Game,” a strategic rivalry for influence over Central Asia. Today, the region’s location at the crossroads of two emerging superpowers, Russia and China, along with vast natural gas reserves, places the land west of the Caspian at the center of international competition once more. This round, though less visible, is no less significant. Indeed, the conflict’s outcome hinges upon some of the world’s defining geopolitical trends: Russia’s newfound boldness in its international relations and the rise of China. At stake is the development of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, countries whose dependence on Russia has largely resulted in authoritarian regimes and stagnant economies. As such, these Central Asian nations may find these geopolitical trends will affect their economic and political futures more than their own actions will.
Central Asia: Russia’s Backyard
Though much has changed since the original Great Game, Russia continues to hold a dominant position in Central Asia. The nation enjoys a near monopoly over the flow of Central Asian energy and controls the pipelines directed towards Europe. According to Radu Dudau, a visiting Black Sea Security Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, “the primary dimension of the game is the export of Caspian resources westwards to Europe.” As Dudau explained, Europe remains the destination for almost all the natural gas produced by Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan because nations in the E.U. are willing to pay the highest prices. As the link between Asia and Europe, Russia has enjoyed the position of the single buyer, until very recently, of Central Asian gas, and has used its monopsony to its advantage.
Russia’s influence also bases on key geographic and historical advantages. Not only does the nation control the territory between Central Asia to Europe, but its hegemony in the Caspian Sea, a vestige of the Cold War era, allows it to prevent the construction of a trans-Caspian pipeline from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan, which would bypass Russian territory. According to a report by Martha Olcott, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment, the additional threat of a “Russian boycott of Turkmen gas, should that government sign on to shipping gas in an undersea pipeline,” remains a strong barrier to the extension of the Nabucco pipeline across the Caspian Sea, which would make Turkmenistan a principal European gas supplier. With Russia dominating the pipelines, Central Asian nations largely remain in the orbit of their former rulers.
Russia and China: Cautious Partners
In this climate, China, with its enormous appetite for cheap fossil fuels, has emerged as a transformative force. In particular, the completion of the recent Turkmenistan-China pipeline through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan represents a major breakthrough for Central Asian countries in their push for independence from Russia. While Russia and China may appear natural competitors, however, a showdown over natural resources seems unlikely. According to Edward Chow, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Russia is primarily concerned with gas in Central Asia competing with Russian gas in Europe” and even played a role in constructing a recent pipeline which ships Turkmen gas to China. Because Russia would rather see Central Asian gas being sold at lower rates to China than competing with more highly priced Russian gas in Europe, both nations appear satisfied with present arrangements.
In the long run, however, China represents Russia’s most relevant strategic adversary. Just as Beijing’s sphere of influence now encompasses oil suppliers in Africa, China could very well begin to exercise political and economic muscle in Central Asia. Dudau cited northward population pressure in Siberia as just one of the many long-term issues that will inevitably complicate the relationship between these two Eastern powers. The time frame for these issues remains significant, but such is no guarantee of stability down the road. As Johannes Linn of the Brookings Institution noted in an interview, “For the foreseeable future, the base load of existing infrastructure…goes through Russia, but the margin will go increasingly to China.”
U.S. Influence?
While half a world away, China’s ascendance and Russia’s resurgence affects the United States. As Harvard Kennedy School professor Meghan O’Sullivan told the HPR, the U.S. is particularly “interested in seeing that Europe’s dependence on Russia is diminished so that Russia is not in a position to use its energy resources to influence the politics of Europe or European nations.” Crises such as the 2009 Russia-Ukraine dispute over natural gas prices, which lasted over two weeks, have given both Europe and the United States reason to pause. Further, as a large natural gas consumer, the United States benefits from an increase in the global supply of energy.
Nonetheless, Dudau asserts that the United States is beginning to back away from the region as part of its new approach to Russian relations. In accordance with Obama’s “reset policy,” Dudau argues that “the current policy of the White House is to accommodate Russia more in its own vicinity,” such as in the former Soviet satellites, in exchange for support for the U.S.’s more important foreign policy objectives in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran. American non-intervention may still come at a significant cost. Without the U.S. to serve as a fair arbiter in the region, it will be difficult for Central Asian nations to break away from their Russian dependence on gas pipelines for revenue.
Authoritarian Capitalism: A Regional Governmental Model
If only for geographic reasons, Russia’s ties to the region—economic, political, and military—will likely continue for the foreseeable future. This has political, as well as economic, implications. Russia has long provided military support to friendly authoritarian regimes in the region. Many experts believe that diversification away from Russian pipelines holds the key to both economic and political freedom. “Energy here becomes a means to Central Asian political independence, as it can provide some of the economic security these countries need,” stated O’Sullivan. Yet China and Russia have both demonstrated that market-based economic success and political authoritarianism are not wholly incompatible. Dudau argues, “there is this sort of authoritarian capitalism that is quite a model in the region that gives [Central Asian leaders] hope that there is not much to be changed.” With the U.S. likely backing out of the region, and Russia and China interested in preserving the status quo, at least politically, it is likely that there will be no force for change in Central Asia. The old Great Game may be over, but the new era looks very much the same.
Arjun Mody ‘14 is a Staff Writer