On March 20, Hugo Chavez once again became the subject of international headlines when the Venezuelan president condemned U.S.-led military action in Libya, arguing that intervention was part of an American plan to control Libya’s oil supplies. Chavez further alluded to the possibility of an American intervention in Venezuela, to which he responded, “Don’t even think about it Mr. Obama.” In ordinary times, Chavez’s nationalistic paeans would have bolstered his political standing and scattered his opponents. Yet picking fights with President Obama may soon be the least of Chavez’s concerns.
The recent turmoil in the Middle East has uprooted autocratic leaders across the globe, but it has also given Chavez a unique and perilous opportunity. Politically, the Libyan military intervention has provided a reason to maintain anti-American rhetoric abroad, while the increase in oil prices could provide the president with the resources necessary to recover some of the popularity he has lost at home. However, Chavez faces new challenges that could threaten his ability to stay in power after the 2012 elections, particularly economic crisis, disagreements with the military, and the reemergence of a united opposition. Whatever the ultimate outcome, Chavez’s poor handling of these various domestic matters means that he cannot ride to reelection on anti-American rhetoric and oil-fueled spending alone. Chavez’s future now also relies on his ability to maintain and expand his control of key institutions in Venezuela, heretofore the nexus of his rule.
Votes to Buy
Throughout Chavez’ 11-year tenure, revenue from the nation’s oil fields has proven the president’s most potent political asset. Since 1999, the state-run Petróleos de Venezuela has dispersed an estimated $60 billion to build houses, schools, and patronage networks, all at Chavez’s direction. Riordan Roett, professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University, told the HPR, “As long as oil prices remain high, he has sufficient wealth to buy popular support.” Oil dividends aid Venezuela in two senses; they enable Chavez’s government to prove social spending on the nation’s lower classes, while boosting GDP more broadly. As such, the recent run-up in oil prices would seem to leave the president in an enviable position.
Nonetheless, the fate of Chavez’s administration may prove more complex than the commodities indices would suggest. Although he still remains the most popular politician in Venezuela, Chavez’s approval ratings have fallen below 50 percent, with the opposition increasingly potent. Indeed, opposition candidates won 47.2 percent of the vote in the 2010 national assembly election, by far their best showing of the Chavez years. Pollsters blamed the comparatively poor results of the ruling United Socialist Party on the woes of the Venezuelan economy. Similar political crises have seen Chavez seek to use oil revenue to boost popularity. Facing a 2003 recall referendum, for example, Chavez created a series of “misiones,” antipoverty measures, which allowed him to survive the vote. As such, it was perhaps unsurprising that in 2010, after the election, Chavez merely pledged to continue with his current policies.
New Decade, New Difficulties
Nevertheless, purchasing popular support remains only one of Chavez’s challenges. Javier Corrales, professor of political science at Amherst College, asserts that Chavez faces new institutional and political difficulties. In particular, Corrales points to the “government’s incompetence, which hinders policy effectiveness, a stronger electoral coalition than at any point since 2004, and potential internal disagreements within the military.” Though the president has grown used to ruling unopposed, Venezuela’s economic woes, including 28.7 percent inflation and double-digit unemployment, have eroded much of Chavez’s standing.
Indeed, focus on social spending alone may well backfire. Leonardo Vivas, fellow at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, observes that economic problems increasingly preoccupy the majority of the Venezuelan electorate. “Issues like security, jobs, and price hikes still worry a majority of Venezuelans,” Vivas explained. While misiones are popular among the poor they serve, Chavez has offered relatively little for middle class Venezuelans. Yet, in the short run at least, it seems that the situation will not improve. Luis Davila, fellow at the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, asserts, “Social, economic and political problems in Venezuela are of such a magnitude that even if oil prices grasp to $200 there is too little to do there.” Unless Chavez implements policies to tackle general financial concerns, people’s support for his so-called “revolution” might soon vanish.
Not So Fast
Nonetheless, the sum of Venezuela’s challenges may not necessarily equate to the end of Chavez’s twenty-first century socialism. After over a decade in power, Chavez enjoys more than a few tricks up his sleeve. First, the president’s rhetorical gifts and natural charisma may yet help him maintain local support. Carlos Blanco, professor at Universidad Central de Venezuela, told the HPR, “If Chavez and his government are able to convey the idea that falling oil prices and the deteriorating economic situation are due to the forces of capitalism, he can partially avoid the erosion of his popularity.” Most important, even if popular support does not back him, Chavez may already enjoy enough control of state institutions to maintain his grip in power and manipulate the outcome of elections, whatever the people vote. For example, by changing the electoral laws, the United Socialist Party managed to secure a near-supermajority of the seats in the 2010 parliamentary elections, even the party won slightly under half of the votes. Further, as Professor Corrales and Michael Penfold point out in their book Dragon in the Tropics, Chavez now enjoys control over important branches of government, greater influence in the economy, more power over the private media, complete obsequiousness of the courts, the electoral council, and his own party. Neither the voters, nor even a unified opposition, have the strength to fight against such institutions, should they side with their benefactor.
The political events in the Middle East have had consequences around the world. Yet, surprisingly, their ripple effects have the power to shape the future of countries like Venezuela. Although politically speaking, these events might only serve to fuel Chavez’s rhetoric, the international community seems to take Chavez’s remarks less seriously every time. Economically, the increase in oil prices brought about by the tensions in the Middle East could have some impact in Chavez’s performance leading to the 2012 elections. However, regardless of whether the money provided by oil has a positive or negative effect, it seems apparent that Chavez’s strength has stopped depending on one single factor. Chavez may, and likely will, win reelection in 2012, or at least re-inauguration. Nonetheless, the president’s victory, if it comes, will be not on oil alone.
Jonatan Lemus ‘12 is a Contributing Writer.