Much of the international attention on Russia’s incursion into the Crimean Peninsula has focused on narratives of Russian strength and American weakness. Commentators from Charles Krauthammer at the Washington Post to Foreign Policy CEO and Editor-at-Large David Rothkopf have issued both implicit and overt criticisms of the “weak” American response to Russian aggression. The prevailing narrative for many, including Secretary of State John Kerry, seems to be that Russia is behaving with a Cold War mentality that is out of place in the 21st century, and that the United States needs to stand up and demonstrate resolve in the face of this aggression.
For all of the diplomatic tough talk, military maneuvers, and high level meetings that have dominated the crisis in the Ukraine, there is a much greater possible price to pay for Russia’s military incursion than Ukrainian territory or American resolve. As the Soviet Union crumbled in the early 1990s, a large amount of its nuclear arsenal ended up in the territory of the new state of Ukraine, which, scholar Steven Pifer notes, gave Kiev one of the largest nuclear weapons arsenals in the world. The agreement that dismantled Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal is threatened by Russia’s provocative actions, and so is the concept of nonproliferation treaties around the world.
Something to Trade
The new nation faced a series of challenges, from economic hardship to a fragile political system. Both the United States and Russia, seeking to limit the number of possibly unsecured nuclear weapons in the region, began negotiations with Ukraine to surrender the arsenal. Despite the significant costs in maintenance and security that came with possessing the weapons, Ukraine wanted a series of concessions on the issues of territory and security in exchange for handing them over.
At the end of the negotiations, the United States, Russia, Ukraine, and Great Britain signed the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, which set the conditions under which Ukraine would surrender its nuclear weapons. These included some assistance in removing the weapons, and pledges by the other signatories to refrain from using economic measures and to support Ukraine in the United Nations in the event of an act of aggression against it. Most importantly, especially in relation to the current situation,,the signing powers agreed “to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.”
The Russian incursion into Ukraine is a violation of the commitments made by in the Budapest Memo to Ukraine and to the United States. However, if the United States fails to help Ukraine maintain its territory, it will also have failed in upholding the spirit, if not the letter, of the Budapest Memo. This is disturbing because it essentially demonstrates signatories of a nuclear nonproliferation deal reneging on their agreements, and sets a very disturbing precedent for all nonproliferation negotiations going forward.
A Failure to Communicate
International agreements are effective in international relations because of the idea that all of the agreeing parties will abide by the agreement, regardless of their different levels of hard and soft power. Nations who pursue nuclear weapons generally do so to deter or confront an external threat, and so feel that it is a vital national interest to develop a nuclear arsenal. The challenge for countries seeking to promote nonproliferation is to convince nuclear aspirants that their security will not be in jeopardy if they halt their nuclear quest.
Russia’s decision to ignore its commitment to Ukraine in the Budapest Memo has dealt a major blow to this principle of security guarantees. Any nation being offered a security guarantee by the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and China will see the specter of Ukraine and Russia’s violation of the Budapest Memo when deliberating whether or not to sign a deal. This will not create an utterly insurmountable barrier to advancing the cause of nonproliferation, but it will make negotiating with regimes in Iran and North Korea significantly more difficult.
The United States is facing a series of challenges in the Ukrainian crisis, from a threat of NATO action or possible civil war in the center of Europe to Washington’s fast-freezing relationship with Russia; nuclear proliferation should be added to this list of issues. A failure to uphold nonproliferation agreements now damages future negotiations and weakens future agreements. Stumbling in the pursuit of nuclear nonproliferation will make potentially nuclear states like Iran and North Korea much less willing to give up their programs, a prospect that is not in the interest of the United States or Russia. Because of this shared interest in promoting nonproliferation, it is possible that reemphasizing the commitments made by the United States and Russia to Ukraine in 1994 could help deescalate the current tensions. Rather than being relegated to the background of debate, the issue of nuclear security may be a way to engage Russia in finding a solution that allows each party to save face. But as long as the crisis festers, the principle of arms control around the world suffers with it, leaving the future of nonproliferation uncertain.
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