Can six-party stakeholders return the next volley?
On Feb. 13, 2007, six-party talks with North Korea reached a breakthrough. In exchange for economic and energy aid, the regime would begin dismantling its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon in a key step towards denuclearization. But a major setback occurred in December 2008, when the D.P.R.K. suddenly halted the process and refused to continue talks. In March, it carried out a failed but highly provocative satellite launch likely intended to bolster its bargaining position ahead of another round of negotiations.
The North’s volatile behavior is, of course, a perennial obstacle. But China’s soft-line approach, and Japan’s tendency to use six-party talks as a forum for addressing unrelated disputes over decades-old abductions, have also been serious impediments to the denuclearization process. As China’s policy towards the regime is likely rooted in rigid geo-strategic interests, the practical lesson of the past two years is that Washington must seek a separate framework for dealing with Japanese concerns to accomplish the objective of the talks.
“Quiet Diplomacy” versus Confrontation
North Korea’s ability to wring concessions from the United States stems in part from its perception that China, which supports the regime as a means to stability on the Korean peninsula, will toe a softer line. “China emphasizes quiet diplomacy as opposed to confrontation,” said Nicholas Szechenyi, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in an interview with the HPR. In March 2007, before starting denuclearization, Pyongyang demanded $25 million in assets that had been frozen by the U.S. Treasury Department. Washington wanted to press the regime on its February commitments, but China advised returning the funds.
The Bush administration had planned to withhold the frozen assets until the Yongbyon reactor had been completely disabled, but the absence of a joint position with China allowed North Korean to stall and take a heavy bargaining chip off the table. Scott Snyder, a Korea expert at The Asia Foundation, told the HPR that the North Koreans are “willing to pursue the lowest common dominator.” This can thwart progress on other issues by allowing North Korea to drive a political wedge between two parties.
Abduction Politics
The more recent setback in the talks illustrates Japan’s hard-line approach on the D.P.R.K.’s status as a state sponsor of terrorism, which it ties to the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korean spies in the 1970s and 1980s. In October 2008, Washington took the regime off of its official list of terror sponsors in an attempt to accelerate denuclearization. Japan responded by refusing to deliver its share of fuel oil under the February agreement, and in turn North Korea stopped dismantling its nuclear facilities. Mitchell Reiss, vice provost for international affairs at the College of William and Mary, told the HPR that Japanese leaders were frustrated by failed attempts to gain information about the abductees, some of whom may be alive today. “They tried, repeatedly — but the North Koreans refused, so [Japan] had to take unilateral steps,” Reiss explained.
Although Japan may not have anticipated that its move would derail the negotiating process, the risk it took revealed the extent to which the country expects U.S. support on the abduction issue. Said Szechenyi, “they thought that America would not make any moves without Japanese satisfaction.” The challenge for Washington ahead of the next round of six-party talks is to assure Japan of its attempt to collaborate in pressuring Pyongyang on the abduction issue, while encouraging Japanese leaders to use a separate diplomatic track outside of the talks.
Why Six-Party Talks?
Resolving differences among multiple negotiating partners is no easy task, but the multilateral approach has yielded some recent benefits. Insook Kim, research associate at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, told the HPR that landmark agreements such as the one struck in February 2007 indicate gradual progress under the six-party framework. “[M]ultilateral negotiations have led North Korea to take incremental and concrete steps toward the ultimate goal of denuclearization,” Kim noted.
According to Szechenyi, six-party diplomacy remains “extremely important” because “all of the stakeholders are involved” in a more equitable distribution of responsibility. The framework, however, requires “the attention and the will necessary to hold [North Korea] to the terms of the agreement,” Snyder cautioned. But it may be Tokyo, not Pyongyang, that requires the primary attention of American diplomats in the coming months.