Xi Jinping seemed uncharacteristically sanguine after his recent meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Sino-Russian relations are at their “best time in history,” the Chinese leader boldly proclaimed after a two-day state visit to Russia last year. Indeed, though China and Russia make a strong team when it comes to counterbalancing the United States, their apparent unity betrays fierce competition over a region that both countries have long regarded as their natural sphere of influence: Central Asia.
Many commentators have been quick to draw parallels to the historical “Great Game,” which saw the Russian and British empires tussle for influence in the Caspian Sea region for much of the 19th century. More recently, a shared Soviet history and tight net of military bases have allowed Putin to re-establish Russian dominance in Central Asia. Though Russia’s political influence stands little chance against China’s new economic offensives like the One Belt One Road Initiative, Chinese partnerships are not without their own drawbacks. To avoid extensive dependence on either country, Central Asian countries may continue to embrace a flexible approach based on safeguarding their autonomy while balancing the major powers’ interests.
Two Trade Visions
Since the sudden dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, outside actors have scrambled to gain control of Central Asia’s natural resources and its valuable strategic position at the crossroads of China, Russia, and the Middle East. Today, this fight largely takes the form of trade agreements. Russia and China have offered two contrasting visions for the future of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. China views its ambitious One Belt One Road initiative as a first step towards a free-trade zone encompassing much of Eurasia. Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union, on the other hand, is a customs union explicitly excluding China.
Cooperation between Russia and China is further limited by their struggle for resources. China desperately needs oil and natural gas from Central Asia to reduce its dependence on energy imports flowing through the U.S.-controlled Strait of Malacca. While Kazakhstan still exports most of its gas to Russia, China has already succeeded in procuring the bulk of Turkmenistan’s natural gas reserves. “In terms of energy resources, it’s a zero-sum game,” Karen Smith Stegen, professor of political science at Jacobs University, told the HPR.
In addition, many Central Asian nations depend greatly on remittances from labor migrants working in Russia. For Kyrgyzstan, these remittances compose 30 to 40 percent of the country’s GDP. Trade deals with Russia further prop up the economies of Central Asia. “Kyrgyzstan‘s economy is very weak and very vulnerable to external shocks,” Baktybek Beshimov, who teaches at Northeastern University, explained to the HPR. The EEU may be Russia’s best hope to retain the countries’ dependence on their former sovereign. Yet, because of the crisis caused by the devaluation of the Russian ruble, neither Kazakhstan nor Kyrgyzstan have benefitted from the economic partnership as much as they hoped. Only recently has the volume of trade started to tick up again.
Thus, Central Asian policymakers have increasingly turned east in search of more equal business relationships. As part of its ambitious One Belt One Road Initiative, China has constructed refinery plants, built pipelines, and invested heavily in the region in an effort to secure its energy imports. “This is really going to become the main driver of growth and interconnectedness of this entire region,” Smith Stegen predicted. According to Olga Pindyuk, an expert on Kazakhstan at the Vienna Institute of Economic Studies, the relationship is mutually beneficial because “Kazakhstan needs investment into infrastructure to boost its economic growth.” Its decision to deepen relations with China to balance against its Russian neighbor has led Xi to welcome the “strategic partnership with Central Asian countries.”
Since 2013, China has invested over $50 billion in countries along the Belt and Road to lessen its dependence on maritime trade and strengthen its grip over the troubled Xinjiang region by fueling economic development and ameliorating ties to neighboring states. Central Asia is the testing ground for a new Sino-centric world order based on a state-centered economic development model and mutually profitable business relations. Unlike its competitors, China seeks neither overt political nor military domination — an enticing alternative for the ex-Soviet ‘stans.’ “No one can compete with that,” Stegen Smith told the HPR.
Escaping the Russian Bear’s Grip
Putin has never come to terms with Russia’s loss of control over Central Asia following the Soviet Union’s disintegration. “Russia still views the area as its natural backyard,” Smith Stegen explained. Russia wields both soft and hard power over the region. “Culturally, all of these countries continue to be under the influence of Russia,” Beshimov remarked to the HPR. Cultural Russian-Kyrgyz ties are so deep that Vladimir Putin enjoys much higher approval ratings there than any national politician. In Kyrgyzstan’s most recent elections, said Beshimov, “all candidates competed with each other over sympathy with Russia.” But these cultural ties are beginning to fade. In a perceived slight to Moscow, Kazakhstan has announced its plans to abandon the Cyrillic alphabet, becoming the third country in the region to do so.
Russia has a significant military presence as well. In addition to heading the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a military alliance between six ex-Soviet states, Russia maintains military bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. This military influence has been met with hostility. “Today Kyrgyzstan has just become a puppet state of Russia,” alleged Beshimov, who blamed Russian interference for the 2012 regime change. Before his death in 2016, Uzbek strongman Islam Karimov did not shy away from calling out Russian “neo-imperialism.” Russia’s protracted war effort in Ukraine, another ex-Soviet state, has only aggravated fears of imperialism. Consequently, both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have resolutely rejected CSTO membership.
Russia’s new military assertiveness may be a desperate last attempt to maintain its century-old regional dominance in the face of inevitable economic decline. “Russia understands that it cannot compete with China economically,” Beshimov opined. However, the benefits of the region’s economic boom could extend to Russia too. “If Russia played its cards right, it would also benefit,” Smith Stegen suggested. Therefore, Putin, while building up the EEU, has agreed to publicly endorse China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Alas, the Chinese option may come with a catch as well. Anti-Chinese sentiment and fears about Chinese dominance are widespread in countries, like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, that directly border the Middle Kingdom. “[Chinese-led] development in the countries has not always been to the benefit of these countries because China brings in their own workers,” Smith Stegen told the HPR. Kazakhstan, a highly restricted dictatorship with a limited supply of arable terrain, erupted with protests in 2016 over a proposed land reform that would have allowed foreign — primarily Chinese — investors to rent farmland for up to 25 years. “The protests reflect widespread fears of the public of Chinese dominance in the economy,” said Pindyuk.
As a consequence, countries such as Kazakhstan have had to tread a fine line: instead of allying with any single country, they have attempted to play the great powers against each other. Regional policymakers like Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev have realized that they need to cooperate with all major powers in the region in order to preserve their energy independence. As Central Asian countries are growing wealthier, they are increasingly consolidating their autonomy. “They no longer need to play this game of submission to larger countries particularly when they have something that everyone wants,” Smith Stegen said. In fact, China at the moment accounts for less than 10 percent of foreign direct investment flows and only holds 7 percent of Kazakhstan’s external debt. “So far, Kazakhstan has been successful in its strategy to diversify economic partners,” Pindyuk told the HPR.
China has a historical claim to the Central Asian region not unlike Russia’s. If Chinese capabilities continue to increase, its march west might retrench its political and even military hold over the region. To keep Chinese ambitions in check, the Central Asian nations are seeking mutually beneficial relations with all major powers, including Russia. Russia, in turn, should make use of its present good relations with China to jump on the bandwagon steered by its powerful ally in the Far East.