Just over a week ago, two U.S. Navy sailors were found guilty of raping a woman on the Japanese island of Okinawa. The incident, which came to light in October of last year, incited a string of passionate anti-U.S. demonstrations within Japan. The anger resulted in the implementation of an unprecedented curfew, restricting the soldiers to their bases between the hours of 11 p.m. and 5 a.m. Despite this and other such measures, natives of Okinawa, and the nation as a whole, have continued to denounce the U.S. military presence in their country, a contempt that has lasted for decades.
One of the biggest changes to the balance of power in Europe and Asia in the aftermath of World War II was in Japan. After the Japanese surrendered, the United States armed forces assumed complete military control in the nation and decommissioned both the Japanese Army and Navy; this was accomplished by drafting a new Japanese constitution, implemented in 1947, which contained an explicit “no armed forces” clause. Japan existed in this state of quasi-sovereignty for the next four years.
In 1951, the Treaty of San Francisco was signed and ratified between the Allied Powers and Japan to reinstate the latter’s status as a sovereign state. Simultaneously, the United States and Japan co-ratified the Japan-America Security Alliance of 1951, establishing that the “United States Forces Japan” (USFJ): members of the United States armed forces permanently stationed in Japan with the legal obligation to defend the country from external threats. As stated in the treaty itself, “Japan desires, as a provisional arrangement for its defense, that the United States of America should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan.” To reciprocate, the Japanese pledged resources to be available for U.S. use. Eight years later, complaints began to arise, calling for a revision of the original treaty. Discussion of the issue began in late 1959, and despite violent opposition from both the Japanese and American populaces, the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was drafted and ratified by the United States and Japan in Washington, D.C. in January of 1960.
Article VI was the most significant provision of this Treaty and was later dubbed the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). It explicitly established the role of the USFJ and guaranteed extraterritoriality to service members, reading, “The military authorities of the United States shall have the right to exercise within Japan all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the law of the United States over all persons subject to the military law of the United States.” Moreover, the Article accords other privileges to U.S. military personnel, such as use of any Japanese facilities without cleaning or restoring them, access to any port without paying toll, priority over Japanese citizens in using public services, and exemption from passport and visa requirements.
These numerous exemptions of US personnel from local Japanese laws have been a source of contention since the Treaty’s ratification. Scandals involving rape, vehicular homicide, and other violent crimes perpetrated by U.S. service members against Japanese civilians have been commonplace. Between 1954 to 2000, over 200,000 violent crimes involving U.S. troops were recorded on Japanese soil, according to proceedings carried out by the Japanese House of Representatives on July 1, 2005. Under the terms of extraterritoriality, however, every single service member was excused from conviction on Japanese soil and was legally cleared to be tried in U.S. tribunals, much to the indignation of the Japanese people. After the particularly deplorable Okinawan rape incident of 1995, in which two U.S. Marines and one U.S. sailor kidnapped and gang-raped a twelve-year-old Okinawan schoolgirl, did the United States finally relent in its defense of extraterritoriality, agreeing to admit suspects to the Japanese criminal justice system, though only in cases of rape and murder.
Despite all of the argument and apparent difficulty surrounding the American military occupation of Japan, this presence has also proven beneficial to the United States. It proved a strategic benefit during the Vietnam War, during which the USFJ bases were utilized, U.S. strategic bombers were deployed in Okinawa, and advanced weapons, possibly nuclear or biochemical in nature, were allegedly stored in Okinawa as well. To this day, there are two major U.S. Air Bases in Okinawa. The U.S. Seventh Fleet is still based in Yokosuka and altogether there were 34,221 military personnel from the United States deployed in Japan as of March 31, 2011.
Recently, Japanese citizens have begun pushing for the removal of United States troops from the region after a string of incidents that have caused increasing resentment, such as the rape scandals mentioned earlier. For example, the U.S.’s alleged reneging on its promise to relocate an airbase from the urban region of Futenma to a more rural plot of reclaimed land prompted a revolt of 21,000 Okinawan residents seeking to remove the U.S. military presence in the country. The shipping of six MV-22 Osprey aircraft to Okinawa in order to supply the U.S. troops, meanwhile, drew crowds of over 100,000 Japanese protesters. Their anger stemmed both from safety concerns related to the aircraft, as well as from a broader, commonly-held sentiment that the USFJ had been overstepping their boundaries on the island. All in all, the past few months have seen increasing discontent from the Japanese population.
The policy choices in this situation are self-evident: the United States can either remove troops completely from Japan, maintain its current presence on the islands, or take a median route of decreasing the number of troops by some degree.
Each option seems to have many compelling justifications. The first option – to remove troops completely – could prove financially and diplomatically beneficial. First, the budding hostility from ordinary Japanese towards the USFJ causes an egregious decline in American soft power, which in turn severely inhibits its maneuverability both diplomatically and militarily in the region, should real conflict arise. The loss of influence over the Japanese and the ruination of the American reputation would cause the nation to lose a potentially strong ally, proving harmful to American national security. Moreover, the original reasons for establishing the military alliance between the United States and Japan seem outdated. Contemporary Japan is far removed from the nation that perpetrated the bombing of Pearl Harbor. With its strikingly pacifist constitution, the island nation does not have the incentive, desire, or the capability to launch a truly harmful attack on the United States. Consequently, there seems to be no reason to keep Japan almost entirely demilitarized. In fact, keeping Japan’s military replaced with our own could yield the opposite effect and antagonize the nearby potential threats of China, North Korea, or Iran. Finally, the impending budgetary cuts to defense spending in the United States, totalling 487 billion dollars over the next decade, seem to point to a restriction of military activity as the most economically sound and fiscally responsible option for America.
On the other hand, many arguments exist for maintaining United States military presence. First, the American military is providing unspeakable aid to the Japanese economy. With U.S. troops deployed on the islands, the Japanese only spend an average of 1% of their annual GDP on their defense budget. Additionally, the U.S. military itself accounts for 5% of the Okinawan economy, consuming resources and engaging with local businesses. The American presence is also deterring Chinese claims over the islands of Senkaku and Diaoyu, which Japan controls. This bolstering of the Japanese role internationally and economically can only have positive consequences on the United States. A strong Japanese economy is extremely beneficial to America, given the trade partnership between the two nations, the financing provided to the U.S. by the Bank of Japan’s extensive purchases of U.S. Treasury bonds, and Japan’s role as an essential ally in the region more generally. Moreover, the American military presence in Japan offsets the growing strength of China and nuclear-armed North Korea. As noted in a study by Michael J. Green of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “the quantity, range, and lethality of Chinese and North Korean ballistic missiles have grown several-fold in the past decade.” Therefore, keeping the USFJ in operation would mean tangible economic and national security benefits for the United States.
In actuality, the most valid policy option for the United States is to keep troops on the islands, but decrease the number of forces deployed. This option reaps all of the benefits of the other two extremes, while minimizing the risks involved with both. From an economic standpoint, decreasing the number of troops takes steps to account for the imminent budget cuts, while preserving support from the Bank of Japan’s consumption of U.S. Treasuries by keeping the Japanese economy strong. If the U.S. were to remove all troops and bases from the islands, the expenditures involved in this outright evacuation of Japan would far outweigh the costs of a continued, but decreased presence there. There would, for example, be hefty transition costs resulting from returning troops and equipment to the U.S. and from equipment and facilities built for the USFJ but left unused. Additionally, cutting back on the number of troops deployed would be a strong signal of respect toward Japanese sovereignty and the boundaries outlined by the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation. This would be a huge step toward bolstering the American soft power that is so vital for operations in the region and ease tension in the relations between the two nations. Finally, allowing a continued, though slightly diminished presence would still maintain America’s greatest benefits from being present in the region: balancing out the growing military prowess of North Korea and China and helping to keep the Japanese economy strong and healthy, in turn keeping the American and global economies strong.
The history of American military intervention in Japan has been long and, in many ways, disturbing. Often surrounded by scandals, riots, and general bitterness, the United States Forces Japan can easily be dismissed as another harmful American display of force and power. And yet, our presence in the nation does create benefits that are vital to our national security and economic stability. That being said, it is quite evident that a re-evaluation of moral and ethical standards is necessary in this situation. The spirit of extraterritoriality is both insulting and enabling: it demeans the Japanese culture and justice system while also alerting U.S. service members to the obvious lack of punishment for heinous crimes. The sentence for last week’s trial – ten years for Seaman Christopher Browning and nine years for Petty Officer 3rd Class Skyler Dozierwalker, both to be served in a Japanese prison – is a step in the right direction. The largely disrespectful, sometimes despicable mentality of the troops stationed in Japan can only be changed through strict regulation and punishment for wrongdoing. Decreasing the size of the force is also a move towards more peaceful relations. Ultimately, the United States must change its policy in Japan, or else risk violating its own fundamental values and destroying all semblance of concord it has with the crucial island nation.